Albert Barnes Commentary Job 22

Can a man be profitable to God? - Can a man confer any favor on God, so as to lay him under obligation? Eliphaz supposes that Job sets up a claim to the favor of God, because he was of service to him, or because God had something to fear if he was cut off. He maintains, therefore, that a man can confer no favor on God, so as to lay him under obligation. God is independent and supreme. He has nothing to gain if man is righteous—he has nothing to apprehend if he is punished. He is not dependent at all on man.

As he that is wise - Margin, or, “if he may be profitable, does his goodness depend on it.” The meaning of the passage is, a wise man may promote his own advantage, but he cannot be of advantage to God. All the result of his wisdom must terminate on himself, and not on God . Of the correctness of this sentiment there can be no doubt. It accords with reason, and with all that is said in the Scriptures. God is too great to be benefited by man.

He is infinite in all his perfections; he is the original fountain of blessedness; he is supremely wise; he has all resources in himself, and he cannot be dependent on his creatures. He cannot, therefore, be deterred from punishing them by any dread which he has of losing their favor—he cannot be induced to bless them because they have laid him under obligation. Eliphaz meant this as a reply to what Job had said. He had maintained, that God did not treat people according to their character in this life, but that, in fact, the wicked were often prospered, and suffered to live long.

Eliphaz at once infers, that if this were so, it must be because they could render themselves serviceable to God, or because he must have something to dread by punishing them. In the general sentiment, he was right; in the inference he was wrong—since Job had not affirmed that they are spared from any such cause, and since many other reasons may be assigned.

Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that thou art righteous?—This is the same sentiment which was advanced in the previous verse. The meaning is that it can be no advantage to God that a man is righteous. He is not dependent on man for happiness and cannot be deterred from dealing justly with him because He is in danger of losing anything. In this sense, it is true. God has pleasure in holiness wherever it is and is pleased when people are righteous; but it is not true that He is dependent on the character of His creatures for His own happiness, or that people can lay Him under obligation by their own righteousness. Eliphaz applies this general truth to Job, probably because he understood him as complaining of the dealings of God with him, as if he had laid God under obligation by his upright life.

He supposes that it was implied in the remarks of Job, that he had been so upright and of so much consequence, that God ought to have continued him in a state of prosperity. This supposition, if Job ever had it, Eliphaz correctly meets and shows him that he was not so profitable to God that God could not do without him. Yet, do people not often feel this way? Do ministers of the gospel not sometimes feel this way? Do we not sometimes feel this way in relation to some man eminent for piety, wisdom, or learning? Do we not feel as if God could not do without him, and that there was a sort of necessity that God should keep him alive? Yet, how often are such people cut down in the very midst of their usefulness, to show:

1. That God is not dependent on them; and
2. To keep them from pride, as if they were necessary to the execution of the divine plans; and
3. To teach His people their dependence on Him, and not on frail, erring mortals.

When the church places its reliance on a human arm, God very often suddenly knocks the prop away.

Will he reprove thee for fear of thee? – Or, rather, will he come into trial, and argue his cause before a tribunal, because he is afraid that his character will suffer, or because he feels himself bound to appear, and answer to the charges which may be brought? The language is all taken from courts of justice, and the object is, to reprove Job as if he felt that it was necessary that God should appear and answer to what he alleged against him.

Will he enter with thee into judgment? – Will he condescend to enter on a trial with one like you? Will he submit his cause to a trial with man, as if he were an equal, or as if man had any right to such an investigation? It is to be remembered, that Job had repeatedly expressed a desire to carry his cause before God, and that God would meet him as an equal, and not take advantage of his majesty and power to overwhelm him; see (Job 13:3), note; (Job 13:20–21), notes. Eliphaz here asks whether God could be expected to meet “a man,” one of his own creatures, in this manner, and to go into a trial of the cause. He says that God was supreme; that no one could bring him into court; and that he could not be restrained from doing his pleasure by any dread of man.

These sentiments are all noble and correct, and worthy of a sage. Soon, however, he changes the style, and utters the language of severe reproach, because Job had presumed to make such a suggestion. Perhaps, also, in this verse, a special emphasis should be placed on “thee.” “Will God enter into trial with thee ... a man whose wickedness is so great, and whose sin is infinite?” (Job 22:4–5).

Is not your wickedness great? - That is, “Is it not utter presumption and folly for a man, whose wickedness is undoubtedly so great, to presume to enter into a litigation with God?” Eliphaz here “assumes” it as an undeniable proposition, that Job was a great sinner.

This charge had not been directly made before. He and his friends had argued evidently on that supposition, and had maintained that one who was a great sinner would be punished in this life for it, and they had left it to be implied, in no doubtful manner, that they so regarded Job. But the charge had not been before so openly made. Here Eliphaz argues as if that were a point that could not be disputed.

The only “proof” that he had, so far as appears, was, that Job had been afflicted as they maintained great sinners “would be,” and they, therefore, concluded that he must be such. No facts are referred to, except that he was a great sufferer, and yet, on the ground of this, he proceeds to take for granted that he “must have been” a man who had taken a pledge for no cause; had refused to give water to the thirsty; had been an oppressor, etc.

And your iniquities infinite? - Hebrew “And there is no end to your iniquities,” that is, they are without number. This does not mean that sin is an “infinite evil,” or that his sins were infinite in degree; but that if one should attempt to reckon up the number of his transgressions, there would be no end to them. This, I believe, is the only place in the Bible where sin is spoken of, in any respect, as “infinite;” and this cannot be used as a proof text, to show that sin is an infinite evil, for:

1. that is not the meaning of the passage even with respect to Job;
2. it makes no affirmation respecting sin in general; and
3. it was untrue, even in regard to Job, and in the sense in which Zophar meant to use the phrase.

There is no intelligible sense in which it can be said that sin is “an infinite evil;” and no argument should be based on such a declaration, to prove that sin demanded an infinite atonement, or that it deserves eternal sufferings. Those doctrines can be defended on solid grounds - they should not be made to rest on a false assumption, or on a false interpretation of the Scriptures.

For thou hast taken a pledge from thy brother for nought - The only evidence Eliphaz seems to have had of this was that this was a heinous sin, and that since Job seemed to be severely punished, it was to be “inferred” that he must have committed some such sin as this. No way of treating an unfortunate and a suffering man could be more unkind.

A “pledge” is that which is given by a debtor to a creditor, for security for the payment of a debt, and would be, of course, that which was regarded as of value. Garments, which constituted a considerable part of the wealth of the Orientals, would usually be the pledge which would be given.

With us, in such cases, watches, jewelry, notes, mortgages are given as collateral security, or as pledges. The law of Moses required that when a man took his neighbor's garment for a pledge, it should be restored by the time the sun went down (Exodus 22:26–27). The crime charged here on Job was that he had exacted a pledge from another where there was no just claim to it; that is, where no debt had been contracted, where a debt had been paid, or where the security was far beyond the value of the debt. The injustice of such a course would be obvious.

It would deprive the man of the use of the property that was pledged, and it gave the one to whom it was pledged an opportunity of doing wrong, as he might retain it, or dispose of it, and the real owner would see it no more.

And stripped the naked of their clothing - Margin, “clothes of the naked.” That is, of those who were poorly clad, or who were nearly destitute of clothes. The word naked is often used in this sense in the Scriptures; see the notes at John 21:7. The meaning here is that Job had taken away by oppression even the garments of the poor in order to enrich himself.