John Calvin Commentary 1 Corinthians 6

Here, he begins to reprove another fault among the Corinthians—an excessive fondness for litigation, which arose from avarice. Now, this reproof consists of two parts. The first is, that by bringing their disputes before the tribunals of the wicked, they thereby made the gospel contemptible and exposed it to ridicule. The second is, that while Christians should endure injuries with patience, they inflicted injury on others, rather than allow themselves to be subjected to any inconvenience. Thus, the first part is particular; the other is general.

Dare any of you (1 Corinthians 6:1). This is the first statement: that if anyone has a controversy with a brother, it should be decided before godly judges, and it should not be before those who are ungodly. If the reason is asked, I have already said that it is because disgrace is brought upon the gospel, and the name of Christ is held up, so to speak, to the scoffings of the ungodly. For the ungodly, at the instigation of Satan, are always eagerly on the watch for opportunities to find occasion for slander against the doctrine of godliness. Now believers, when they make the ungodly parties in their disputes, seem as though they intentionally furnish them with a pretext for reviling. A second reason may be added: that we treat our brothers disdainfully when we, of our own accord, subject them to the decisions of unbelievers.

But here it may be objected: “As it belongs to the office of the magistrate, and as it is particularly his responsibility to administer justice to all and to decide upon matters in dispute, why should not even unbelievers, who are in the office of magistrate, have this authority? And, if they have it, why are we prevented from maintaining our rights before their tribunals?” I answer that Paul does not here condemn those who, out of necessity, have a case before unbelieving judges, such as when a person is summoned to court; but he condemns those who, of their own accord, bring their brothers into this situation and harass them, so to speak, by means of unbelievers, when it is in their power to use another remedy. It is wrong, therefore, to initiate a lawsuit of one’s own accord against brothers before unbelieving judges. If, on the other hand, you are summoned to court, there is no harm in appearing there and defending your case.

Know you not that the saints... (1 Corinthians 6:2). Here we have an argument from the lesser to the greater. For Paul, desiring to show that injury is done to the Church of God when judgments on disputes connected with earthly things are brought before unbelievers—as if there were no one in the society of the godly who was qualified to judge—reasons in this way: “Since God has considered the saints worthy of such honor as to have appointed them judges of the whole world, it is unreasonable that they should be excluded from judging small matters, as if they were not qualified for it.” Hence it follows that the Corinthians inflict injury upon themselves by resigning into the hands of unbelievers the honor that God has conferred upon them.

What is said here about judging the world should be understood as referring to Christ's declarations, such as:

When the Son of Man shall come, you shall sit, etc. (Matthew 19:28).

And, For all power of judgment has been committed to the Son (John 5:22).

Through these, He will receive His saints to participate with Him in this honor, as assessors. Apart from this, they will judge the world—as indeed they already begin to do—because their piety, faith, fear of the Lord, good conscience, and integrity of life will make unbelievers altogether inexcusable, as it is said of Noah, that by his faith he condemned all the men of his age (Hebrews 11:7). But the former meaning agrees better with the Apostle’s design, for unless you understand the judging spoken of here in its proper sense, the reasoning will not hold.

But even in this sense, it may seem not to have much weight, for it is as if one should say: “The saints are endowed with heavenly wisdom, which immeasurably transcends all human doctrines; therefore, they can judge better regarding the stars than astrologers.” Now, no one will allow this, and the reason for objection is obvious: piety and spiritual doctrine do not confer a knowledge of human arts.

My answer here is this: between expertise in judging and other arts, there is this difference—while the latter are acquired by acuteness of intellect and by study, and are learned from masters, the former depends more on equity and conscientiousness.

But some may object: “Lawyers will judge better and more confidently than an illiterate Christian; otherwise, the knowledge of law is of no advantage.” I answer that their advice is not excluded here, for if the determination of any obscure question requires knowledge of the laws, the Apostle does not prevent Christians from consulting lawyers.

What he finds fault with in the Corinthians is simply this: that they bring their disputes before unbelieving judges, as if they had no one in the Church qualified to pass judgment. Furthermore, he shows how much superior is the judgment that God has assigned to His believing people.

The words translated in you mean here, in my opinion, among you. For whenever believers meet in one place under the auspices of Christ, there is already in their assembly a sort of image of the future judgment, which will be fully revealed on the last day. Accordingly, Paul says that the world is judged in the Church, because there Christ’s tribunal is erected, from which He exercises His authority.

Know ye not that we shall judge angels? This passage is taken in different ways. Chrysostom states that some understood it as referring to priests, but this is exceedingly far-fetched. Others understand it as referring to the angels in heaven, in this sense — that the angels are subject to the judgment of God’s word, and may be judged by us, if necessary, through that word, as it is said in the Epistle to the Galatians —

If an angel from heaven bring any other gospel, let him be accursed (Galatians 1:8).

Nor does this interpretation appear at first glance inconsistent with the flow of Paul’s argument. For if all whom God has enlightened by his word are endowed with such authority that through that word they judge not only men but angels too, how much more will they be prepared to judge small and trivial matters?

However, since Paul speaks here in the future tense, referring to the last day, and since his words convey the idea of an actual judgment (as the common expression is), it would be preferable, in my opinion, to understand him as speaking of apostate angels. For the argument will be no less conclusive in this way: “Devils, who sprang from such an illustrious origin, and even now, when they have fallen from their exalted position, are immortal creatures and superior to this corruptible world, shall be judged by us. What then? Shall those things that are subservient to the belly be exempted from our judgment?”

If you have judgments then as to things pertaining to this life. We must always keep in view what kind of cases he is addressing, for public trials are beyond our scope and should not be transferred to our control. Regarding private matters, however, it is permissible to make decisions without the magistrate's official involvement.

Since, then, we do not in any way diminish the authority of the magistrate by resorting to arbitration, it is not without good reason that the Apostle instructs Christians to refrain from resorting to profane, that is, unbelieving judges. To prevent them from claiming they were deprived of a better remedy, he directs them to choose arbitrators from the Church who can settle disputes amicably and fairly. Furthermore, to prevent them from claiming they do not have a sufficient number of qualified persons, he says that even the least esteemed is competent to perform this duty.

Therefore, there is no diminishing the dignity of the magistrates' office here when he gives orders that their function be entrusted to persons of low esteem. For this (as I have already said) is stated to preempt an objection, as if he had said: “Even the lowest and least esteemed among you will perform this duty better than those unbelieving judges to whom you resort. You are so far from being under any necessity to do this.”

Chrysostom approaches this interpretation, though he adds something to it; for he believes that the Apostle intended to say that, even if the Corinthians found no one among themselves with enough wisdom to judge, they must still choose some, regardless of their character.

Ambrose touches neither heaven nor earth. I believe I have faithfully explained the Apostle’s intention: that he preferred the lowest among believers over unbelievers regarding their ability to judge.

Some propose a completely different meaning, understanding the word καθιζετε to be in the present tense—You set them to judge—and by those that are least esteemed in the Church they understand profane persons. This, however, is more ingenious than solid, for that would be a poor designation for unbelievers. Besides, the phrasing, if you have, would not fit so well with a rebuke, as the expression would rather have needed to be while you have; for that condition reduces its force. Therefore, I am more inclined to think that a remedy for the evil is prescribed here.

That this statement, however, was misunderstood by the ancients is evident from a certain passage in Augustine. For in his book, "On the Work of Monks," where he mentions his duties, he declares that among his many responsibilities, the most disagreeable of all was being obligated to devote part of the day to secular affairs; but that he nevertheless endured it patiently, because he believed the Apostle had imposed this necessity on him.

From this passage, and from a certain letter, it appears that bishops were accustomed to preside at certain hours to settle disputes, as if the Apostle were referring to them here. However, as matters always tend to worsen, from this error, in the course of time, sprang the jurisdiction that bishops' officials claim for themselves in financial matters.

In that ancient custom, there are two things deserving of criticism: that the bishops were involved in matters unrelated to their office, and that they wronged God by using His authority and command as an excuse to neglect their proper calling. This wrongdoing, however, was to some extent excusable; but as for the profane custom that has come to prevail in the Papacy, it would be the height of baseness to excuse or defend it.

I speak to your shame. The meaning is — if other considerations do not influence you, let it at least be considered by you how disgraceful it is to you that there is not so much as one among you who is qualified to settle an affair amicably among brethren — an honor which you assign to unbelievers. Now, this passage is not inconsistent with the declaration we encountered earlier, when he stated that he did not mention their faults for the purpose of shaming them (1 Corinthians 4:14), for instead of this, by putting them to shame in this manner, he calls them back from disgrace and shows that he is desirous to promote their honor. He does not wish them, then, to form so unfavorable an opinion of their society as to take away from all their brethren an honor which they allow to unbelievers.

Now indeed there is utterly a fault. Here we have the second part of the reproof, which contains a general doctrine; for he now reproves them, not on the ground of their exposing the gospel to derision and disgrace, but on the ground of their going to law with each other.

This, he says, is a fault. We must, however, observe the appropriateness of the term he employs.

For ἥττημα in Greek signifies weakness of mind, as when one is easily broken down by injuries and cannot bear anything. It subsequently comes to be applied to vices of any kind, as they all arise from weakness and deficiency in fortitude.

What Paul, then, condemns in the Corinthians is this—that they harassed one another with lawsuits. He states the reason for it: that they were not prepared to bear injuries patiently.

And certainly, as the Lord commands us (Matthew 5:44; Romans 12:21) not to be overcome by evil, but on the contrary to overcome injuries with acts of kindness, it is certain that those who cannot control themselves to suffer injuries patiently commit sin by their impatience. If contention in lawsuits among believers is a sign of that impatience, it follows that it is faulty.

In this way, however, he seems to entirely discard judgments regarding the affairs of individuals. “Those are altogether in the wrong who go to law. Hence it will not be allowable for anyone to maintain his rights by resorting to a magistrate.” There are some who answer this objection in this way—that the Apostle declares that where there are lawsuits there is utterly a fault, because, necessarily, one or the other has a bad cause.

They do not, however, escape by this sophistry, because he says that they are in fault, not merely when they inflict injury, but also when they do not patiently endure it. For my own part, my answer is simply this—having a little before given permission to turn to arbiters, he has in this shown sufficiently clearly that Christians are not prohibited from prosecuting their rights moderately and without any breach of love.

Hence we may readily infer that his being so severe was because he particularly considered the circumstances of the case.

And undoubtedly, wherever there is frequent resort to lawsuits, or where the parties stubbornly contend with each other with the rigor of the law, it is in that case abundantly clear that their minds are excessively inflamed with wrong dispositions and are not prepared for equity and endurance of wrongs, according to the commandment of Christ.

To speak more plainly, the reason why Paul condemns lawsuits is that we ought to suffer injuries with patience. Let us now see whether anyone can carry on a lawsuit without impatience; for if it is so, to go to law will not be wrong in all cases, but only ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—for the most part.

I confess, however, that as people's conduct is corrupt, impatience, or lack of patience (as they say), is an almost inseparable accompaniment of lawsuits.

This, however, does not prevent you from distinguishing between the thing itself and its improper accompaniment.

Let us therefore bear in mind that Paul does not condemn lawsuits because it is a wrong thing in itself to maintain a good cause by turning to a magistrate, but because it is almost invariably accompanied by corrupt dispositions, such as violence, desire for revenge, enmities, obstinacy, and the like.

It is surprising that this question has not been more carefully handled by ecclesiastical writers. Augustine has given it more attention than the others and has come nearer the mark; but even he is somewhat obscure, though there is truth in what he states.

Those who aim for greater clarity in their statements tell us that we must distinguish between public and private revenge. For while the magistrate’s vengeance is appointed by God, those who turn to it do not rashly take vengeance by their own hand but turn to God as an Avenger.

This, it is true, is said judiciously and appropriately. However, we must go a step further, for if it is not allowable even to desire vengeance from God, then, on the same principle, it would not be allowable to turn to the magistrate for vengeance.

I acknowledge, then, that a Christian man is altogether prohibited from revenge, so that he must not exercise it, either by himself, or by means of the magistrate, nor even desire it. If, therefore, a Christian man wishes to prosecute his rights at law, so as not to offend God, he must, above all things, be careful that he does not bring into court any desire for revenge, any corrupt disposition of the mind, or anger, or, in short, any other poison. In this matter love will be the best regulator.

If it is objected that it very rarely happens that anyone carries on a lawsuit entirely free and exempt from every corrupt disposition, I acknowledge that it is so. I say further that it is rare to find a single instance of an upright litigant.

However, it is useful for many reasons to show that the thing is not evil in itself but is rendered corrupt by abuse:

1. That it may not seem as if God had appointed courts of justice for no purpose;

2. That the pious may know how far their liberties extend, so that they may not undertake anything against the dictates of conscience.

   For it is for this reason that many rush into open contempt of God when they have once begun to transgress those limits;

3. That they may be admonished that they must always keep within bounds, so as not to pollute by their own misconduct the remedy which the Lord has permitted them to employ;

4. That the audacity of the wicked may be repressed by a pure and uncorrupted zeal, which could not be achieved if we were not allowed to subject them to legal punishments.