John Calvin Commentary 1 Corinthians 6:7

"Nay, already it is altogether a defect in you, that ye have lawsuits one with another. Why not rather take wrong? why not rather be defrauded?" — 1 Corinthians 6:7 (ASV)

Now indeed there is utterly a fault. Here we have the second part of the reproof, which contains a general doctrine; for he now reproves them, not on the ground of their exposing the gospel to derision and disgrace, but on the ground of their going to law with each other.

This, he says, is a fault. We must, however, observe the appropriateness of the term he employs.

For ἥττημα in Greek signifies weakness of mind, as when one is easily broken down by injuries and cannot bear anything. It subsequently comes to be applied to vices of any kind, as they all arise from weakness and deficiency in fortitude.

What Paul, then, condemns in the Corinthians is this—that they harassed one another with lawsuits. He states the reason for it: that they were not prepared to bear injuries patiently.

And certainly, as the Lord commands us (Matthew 5:44; Romans 12:21) not to be overcome by evil, but on the contrary to overcome injuries with acts of kindness, it is certain that those who cannot control themselves to suffer injuries patiently commit sin by their impatience. If contention in lawsuits among believers is a sign of that impatience, it follows that it is faulty.

In this way, however, he seems to entirely discard judgments regarding the affairs of individuals. “Those are altogether in the wrong who go to law. Hence it will not be allowable for anyone to maintain his rights by resorting to a magistrate.” There are some who answer this objection in this way—that the Apostle declares that where there are lawsuits there is utterly a fault, because, necessarily, one or the other has a bad cause.

They do not, however, escape by this sophistry, because he says that they are in fault, not merely when they inflict injury, but also when they do not patiently endure it. For my own part, my answer is simply this—having a little before given permission to turn to arbiters, he has in this shown sufficiently clearly that Christians are not prohibited from prosecuting their rights moderately and without any breach of love.

Hence we may readily infer that his being so severe was because he particularly considered the circumstances of the case.

And undoubtedly, wherever there is frequent resort to lawsuits, or where the parties stubbornly contend with each other with the rigor of the law, it is in that case abundantly clear that their minds are excessively inflamed with wrong dispositions and are not prepared for equity and endurance of wrongs, according to the commandment of Christ.

To speak more plainly, the reason why Paul condemns lawsuits is that we ought to suffer injuries with patience. Let us now see whether anyone can carry on a lawsuit without impatience; for if it is so, to go to law will not be wrong in all cases, but only ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—for the most part.

I confess, however, that as people's conduct is corrupt, impatience, or lack of patience (as they say), is an almost inseparable accompaniment of lawsuits.

This, however, does not prevent you from distinguishing between the thing itself and its improper accompaniment.

Let us therefore bear in mind that Paul does not condemn lawsuits because it is a wrong thing in itself to maintain a good cause by turning to a magistrate, but because it is almost invariably accompanied by corrupt dispositions, such as violence, desire for revenge, enmities, obstinacy, and the like.

It is surprising that this question has not been more carefully handled by ecclesiastical writers. Augustine has given it more attention than the others and has come nearer the mark; but even he is somewhat obscure, though there is truth in what he states.

Those who aim for greater clarity in their statements tell us that we must distinguish between public and private revenge. For while the magistrate’s vengeance is appointed by God, those who turn to it do not rashly take vengeance by their own hand but turn to God as an Avenger.

This, it is true, is said judiciously and appropriately. However, we must go a step further, for if it is not allowable even to desire vengeance from God, then, on the same principle, it would not be allowable to turn to the magistrate for vengeance.

I acknowledge, then, that a Christian man is altogether prohibited from revenge, so that he must not exercise it, either by himself, or by means of the magistrate, nor even desire it. If, therefore, a Christian man wishes to prosecute his rights at law, so as not to offend God, he must, above all things, be careful that he does not bring into court any desire for revenge, any corrupt disposition of the mind, or anger, or, in short, any other poison. In this matter love will be the best regulator.

If it is objected that it very rarely happens that anyone carries on a lawsuit entirely free and exempt from every corrupt disposition, I acknowledge that it is so. I say further that it is rare to find a single instance of an upright litigant.

However, it is useful for many reasons to show that the thing is not evil in itself but is rendered corrupt by abuse:

1. That it may not seem as if God had appointed courts of justice for no purpose;

2. That the pious may know how far their liberties extend, so that they may not undertake anything against the dictates of conscience.

   For it is for this reason that many rush into open contempt of God when they have once begun to transgress those limits;

3. That they may be admonished that they must always keep within bounds, so as not to pollute by their own misconduct the remedy which the Lord has permitted them to employ;

4. That the audacity of the wicked may be repressed by a pure and uncorrupted zeal, which could not be achieved if we were not allowed to subject them to legal punishments.