John Calvin Commentary


John Calvin Commentary
"Therefore thus saith the Lord Jehovah: As I live, surely mine oath that he hath despised, and my covenant that he hath broken, I will even bring it upon his own head." — Ezekiel 17:19 (ASV)
The previous sentence is confirmed. The Prophet had spoken in the usual manner when he said that Zedekiah’s treachery would not go unavenged. However, he now presents God as the speaker because, unless God appeared as an avenger of treachery, people would hardly ever be seriously convinced that punishment was prepared for perjurers and truce-breakers.
As I have said that this opinion was deeply rooted in everyone's hearts, so it must be understood that this opinion was accepted, and that people were fully convinced of it. However, convictions that are called “common” fade away. There are common thoughts that are almost innate and follow our natural inclinations, but they are not steadfast, because ungodly people do not grasp the main point: that God is the judge of the world. Therefore, this declaration is added out of necessity.
Now God swears that Zedekiah would suffer punishment because he had despised the oath and rendered the covenant void. But we must notice the designation, for God calls the oath and the covenant His own. For he has despised it—so God says—not simply the oath, but Mine; he has violated My treaty.
The reason for this language is that God wishes faithfulness between people to be cultivated, and so He detests all perjury and all forms of fraud. Now, since there is no more sacred way of making a treaty than through solemn rituals, God also shows His judgment there in a distinctive manner.
In short, we may rightly call Him the guardian of treaties. For when pagans entered into treaties, they used to invoke the name of Jupiter the supreme, because they thought he would inflict vengeance on all who broke their pledge. But God here presents Himself, not like an imaginary Jupiter, but because He wished trust to flourish in human society; since, unless people act sincerely with each other, all society would disintegrantiate.
This, then, is the reason why Ezekiel says that the treaty made with King Nebuchadnezzar was divine, because God would be its avenger. Meanwhile, we must note that this treaty was lawful and pleasing to God (Jeremiah 27:17). And we see from Jeremiah 28 and Jeremiah 29 that God intended for the Jews to suffer under this disgrace for a time.
For King Zedekiah, if he had truly fulfilled his office, was a type of the Messiah, the firstborn among the kings of the earth. Therefore, it was unworthy of him to become a tributary to an ungodly monarch and a cruel tyrant. But since God had imposed such slavery on His own people, Zedekiah ought to have submitted to the yoke, as it is said there, Be you servants to King Nebuchadnezzar and live. That is, there is no other way to obtain safety unless you allow the Chaldeans to rule over you and you bear their rule calmly, since Nebuchadnezzar is God’s scourge.
This covenant, as I have said, was approved by God; otherwise, He could not have been its avenger. We know that there are three kinds of treaties:
So we saw that the Jews committed adultery when they ran first to Egypt, then to Assyria, and then to Chaldea. But this treaty, which is now being discussed, was necessary, for Zedekiah could not avoid accepting the conditions imposed on him by King Nebuchadnezzar. For this reason, God declares Himself the avenger of treachery.
The question is now raised: May we never break our word when someone has been violently attacked and has promised something that was otherwise unjust? The reply is straightforward: God’s name is more precious than all human advantages. Therefore, if anyone objects that he was deceived and oppressed by unjust conditions, God’s name must still prevail.
Therefore, we must always consider what is due to the name of God. And so we will readily conclude that those who violate their commitments cannot be excused on the pretext of being violently forced, induced by fraud, or not allowed the freedom to consider whether their promise was equitable.
For this reason, also, it is said in the fifteenth Psalm (Psalms 15:4) that the sons of God swear and suffer loss, because when God’s name has been invoked, no benefit ought to be so important as to outweigh an oath that has been taken. And so, not without reason, God now declares that He would avenge the perjury Zedekiah had committed, since, in truth, we cannot break promises sanctioned by an oath in God’s name without appearing to disrespect the Almighty Himself.
Meanwhile, it is certain that there was another reason why God punished the Jews; but here, as I have previously shown, the Prophet mentions what was more familiar to people. The primary cause of the destruction of the city and the whole kingdom was idolatry, as we saw earlier, and then the many crimes of the people were added to this.
For from the time true religion was corrupted, the contamination of many vices spread throughout the city and the whole land. Therefore, it happened that God destined His people for destruction; consequently, King Zedekiah was also deprived of his sight. For, as sacred history testifies, God intended to destroy the whole people; for this reason, Zedekiah fell and provoked the Chaldeans against himself.
We see, therefore, that there is a continuous series of causes in the eternal providence of God, but not as the Stoics supposed. They fabricated their concept of fate from complex intricacies or hidden causes, without any divine will in that confusion.
But God, as I have said, has different reasons for doing one thing or another. Some causes are remote and incomprehensible to us, while others are clear to us. Thus, the immediate cause of the people’s destruction was Zedekiah’s revolt against King Nebuchadnezzar. However, there was another, more important reason: namely, that the people deserved to perish.
Therefore, Zedekiah was made blind by the just judgment of God, since he treacherously defected to the king of Egypt and thus armed himself against King Nebuchadnezzar. But we must maintain that the universally apparent reason is what is examined here.