John Calvin Commentary Leviticus 5

And if a soul sin. The three kinds of offense to which Moses refers in the beginning of the chapter seem to differ much from each other. For the first, when a person concealed a matter that he knew, it could not arise from error. Yet I include this concealment, which he discusses, under the category of error, supposing it to occur when a person might be induced by shame or fear to connive at any crime or offense about which he might be interrogated. And so, without any intention of perjuring himself, but by blinding himself, he would withhold what he would have said if he had duly examined the matter.

Yet these words must be discussed more closely, as interpreters are not well agreed on their meaning. Some think that the word אלה,²⁶⁶ alah, is used for “execration,” as though it meant that if anyone has heard of a misdoing or detestable crime worthy of execration; yet their interpretation is contradicted by what immediately follows: Whether he has seen or known it.

Others, indeed, interpret it to mean an oath, yet they improperly confine it to perjury, as if Moses stated that a person was guilty who had heard a man perjuring himself and had not opposed him, but had instead covered the perjury by his own connivance or silence. I subscribe, then, to the opinion of those who explain it as meaning “adjuration.” For the words will then fit together very well: “If anyone, being summoned as a witness, has heard the voice of adjuration, by which he is required in God’s name to answer truthfully about the matter proposed, and from favoritism, good nature, or any other false pretext, as if enveloped in a cloud of error, conceals what he well knew (had he paid diligent attention), he shall be guilty.”

We must, therefore, render the disjunctive particle here as a conditional. Literally, it is: “If anyone has heard the voice of adjuration, and (is) himself a witness.” But why should he say, if he has been a witness, and then add, or have known it, as if he referred to different things? What I have said fits very well: that a person becomes guilty who, when summoned as a witness, does not testify about a matter of which he is aware. Now, what does hearing the voice of adjuration mean, unless you understand that he is adjured by the mouth of a judge?

We must also observe that the three kinds of sin first enumerated are connected with each other, since they speak of sinners who are infected by the uncleanness of others. For, after Moses had commanded generally that offenses committed in error should be expiated, he now adds what had not been stated explicitly enough: that those who had been polluted by the defilements of others also required atonement. Thus, this first case will accord very well with the other two; that is, if anyone should make himself an accomplice in another's offense by indirect perjury, he shall be unclean until he has offered a propitiation. For this is what the expression bear his iniquity conveys, as if Moses had said that he contracts guilt who has concealed a crime about which he had been interrogated as a witness.

Or if a soul shall swear. Guilt is also ascribed to error and ignorance when a person inconsiderately does what he has promised not to do. For the oath is not violated in that instance in a way that would be criminal,²⁶⁷ but in this very carelessness, there is enough wrongdoing, because sound religion would renew the recollection of the vow. Consequently, where no anxiety (to fulfill it) is shown, there is no serious desire to do so.

But this commandment was necessary because it might often happen that men who had pledged their faith in a vow, and had broken it in thoughtlessness, would deem themselves released from all obligation and would, in the future, give themselves up to indulgence. Whereas those who arrive at such a pitch of licentiousness harden themselves more and more, until finally they throw off all reverence for God.

God would therefore have vows kept faithfully, lest those who despised them should thus rush into impiety. If, then, anyone had thoughtlessly broken faith, he is commanded to make atonement to God—not on account of his levity, as some think (as if he had rashly promised what he was not permitted to), but on account of his neglect, because he had not been diligent to remember the vow at the proper time.

Now, if the Papists stupidly twist this text according to their custom, in order to establish the obligation of all kinds of vows, their refutation is easy: namely, that God requires this steadfastness only with respect to lawful vows duly made.

We have already understood from the teaching of Moses what the rule of pious vow-making is, from which we gather that those vows which profane God’s name are by no means to be kept. For if we begin by doing wrong, obstinacy in it is doubly wicked. In this passage, therefore, “to do evil” is not to perform any improper action, but to undertake something that would otherwise be disagreeable and burdensome to the flesh: such as to diminish domestic expenditure, or to deprive oneself of luxuries, or to determine upon abstinence from something that would gratify or profit us.

And he shall bring his trespass-offering. He continues with what we have already been considering regarding the removal of guilt by sacrifice. However, he begins to make a distinction between the poor and the rich, a distinction that also applies to what has gone before. Thus, it appears that Moses does not strictly observe the order, as the cases he inserts seem to interrupt the flow of his discourse. Yet, the fact remains clear: whoever has fallen through error is unclean until they have offered an atonement.

But what was previously omitted is here inserted: the poor and needy are not to be pressed beyond the extent of their means. Indeed, different levels of offering are appointed, so that anyone for whom it was not convenient to offer two turtledoves or pigeons could satisfy the requirement with a small measure of flour.

From this we infer that God’s only design was to show the people the one true means of reconciliation, so that they might turn to the Mediator and His sacrifice. For the poor are here commanded to offer either two turtledoves or a small quantity of meal, which would propitiate God toward them just as much as the victim required of the rich would.

The citation,²⁶⁸ however, which our interpreters make from the poet is a weak one; namely, “Whoever brings integrity of mind into the temples, makes a sacrifice of grain.” This is because this blind man did not see the purpose of sacrifices and thus despised all kinds of propitiations, as if purity and innocence alone recommended people to God.

We must remember, then, that the victims in themselves were of no importance. Yet, the ancient people were instructed through these ceremonies to teach them that God can only be appeased by the payment of a ransom.

And the Lord spake unto Moses. The difference in the victim clearly shows that another kind of offense is referred to here, for God now requires a male instead of a female. Previously, He had been contented with a ewe lamb or a female kid; but since a ram is more valuable, it follows that punishment is now awarded for a heavier offense.

The heinousness of the fault depends upon the quality of the act; i.e., when a person has wronged not merely a mortal man, but God Himself. This offense consists not in transgressing only one of the Commandments of the First Table, but rather in failing to pay a vow, offering a defective victim, or defrauding God of His right in any oblation. This is what is meant by the clause in the holy things of the Lord.

In this expression, Moses includes both vows made voluntarily and the legitimate oblations, such as tithes, first-fruits, and the offering of the first-born, since in all these matters the Israelites were strictly charged to deal most faithfully with God.

If by chance avarice had blinded anyone, so that in pursuit of personal gain he paid God less than he ought, his recklessness justly received a heavier punishment.

Yet it must be understood that the offense referred to here is one in which no fraud or evil deceit took place. For if anyone had intentionally and craftily appropriated what was sacred, the impiety of this sacrilege was not so easily expiated. But since it often happens that the covetous and grasping are too ready to spare themselves, God enjoins a sacrifice in such a case, where private advantage has through thoughtlessness prevailed over religious feeling.

The words with thy estimation, some refer to Moses, others to the priest; but I prefer to understand it passively as the estimation prescribed by God. This is called the estimation of the people because they were bound to acquiesce in the Law appointed by Him and not arbitrarily alter the value. Moses estimates the ram at two shekels of the sanctuary, equivalent to four common shekels,²⁶⁹ amounting in French money to about twenty-eight sols (asses.).