John Calvin Commentary Numbers 35:16

"But if he smote him with an instrument of iron, so that he died, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death." — Numbers 35:16 (ASV)

And if he smite him with an instrument of iron. God appears to contradict Himself. A little further on, He absolves involuntary murderers, even if they have inflicted the wound with iron or with a stone, while here He absolutely declares that whoever shall smite another with wood, or iron, or a stone, shall be guilty of death.

But this is easily explained if we consider His meaning. For, after having pardoned the unintentional act (errori),⁵³ to prevent any from misconstruing this as affording impunity for crime, He at once anticipates them and again reinforces what has been said before.

By the express mention of iron, wood, and stone, He more clearly explains that no voluntary murders are to be pardoned. Otherwise, as laws are commonly evaded by various subtleties, they would have perhaps endeavored to limit what had been said respecting the punishment of murderers to one single type of murder, namely, when a person had been slain with a sword.

It is not, then, without cause that God condemns to death every kind of murderer—whether he has committed the crime with a weapon (of iron), by throwing a stone, or with a club—since it is sufficient for his condemnation that he conceived the intention to do the evil act.

It is well known that⁵⁴ by the Lex Cornelia, whoever had carried a weapon with the intention of killing a man was guilty. Martianus cites the reply of Adrian: "He who has killed a man, if he did it not with the intention of killing him, may be absolved; and he who has not killed a man, but has wounded him with intention to kill him, is to be condemned as a murderer." Paulus also teaches that in the said Lex Cornelia, the evil intention (dolus) is taken for the deed.

Another reply of Adrian is very true: that in crimes, the will and not the result must be regarded. Hence that saying of Ulpian: that there is no difference between the man who kills and him who causes the death of another.

Here, therefore, God had no other object than to cut off from murderers all means of evasion if they should be convicted of a wicked intention, especially when it resulted in an actual attempt, since there was no difference whether they had made use of a sword, a mallet, or a stone.

⁵³ “De peur que cela ne tirast trop longue queue, et que les criminels en fissent couverture d’impunite, il exprime notamment les facons de tuer plus communes, quand on y va de guet-a-pens. Ainsi en nommant les instrumens, qui sont destinez, ou qu’on applique a mal faire,” etc.; for fear this should be carried too far, and that criminals should make it a ground for impunity, he expressly mentions the more ordinary kinds of deliberate murder. Thus, by naming the instruments, which are intended, or used for inflicting injuries, etc. — Fr..

⁵⁴ Vide Digest. 48, tit. 8. In legem Corneliam de Sicariis, et Veneficiis, 1 Section 3. “Divus Hadrianus rescripsit, eum, qui hominem occidit, si non occidendi animo hoc admisit, absolvi posse: et qui hominem non occidit, sed vulneravit ut occidat, pro homicida damnandum: et ex re constituendum hoc.” — Digest. 48, tit. 8. In legem Corneliam de Sicariis, et Veneficiis, 1 Section 3. “Divus Hadrianus rescripsit, eum, qui hominem occidit, si non occidendi animo hoc admisit, absolvi posse: et qui hominem non occidit, sed vulneravit ut occidat, pro homicida damnandum: et ex re constituendum hoc.” — Ibid., 11 “Ulpianus, lib. 8, ad legem Juliam, et Papiam. Nihil interest, occidat quis, an causam mortis praebeat.” ., 11 “Ulpianus, lib. 8, ad legem Juliam, et Papiam. Nihil interest, occidat quis, an causam mortis praebeat.” Vide item, Julii Pauli Recept. Sentent., lib. 5, tit. 23, Section 2. “Qui hominem occiderit, aliquando absolvitur. Et qui non occidit, in homicida damnatur. Consilium enim uniuscujusque, non factum puniendum est. Ideoque qui cum velit occidere, id casu aliquo perpetrare non potuerit, ut homicida punietur. Et is, qui casu jactu teli hominem imprudenter occiderit, absolvitur.”, Julii Pauli Recept. Sentent., lib. 5, tit. 23, Section 2. “Qui hominem occiderit, aliquando absolvitur. Et qui non occidit, in homicida damnatur. Consilium enim uniuscujusque, non factum puniendum est. Ideoque qui cum velit occidere, id casu aliquo perpetrare non potuerit, ut homicida punietur. Et is, qui casu jactu teli hominem imprudenter occiderit, absolvitur.”