John Calvin Commentary Numbers 36:1

"And the heads of the fathers` [houses] of the family of the children of Gilead, the son of Machir, the son of Manasseh, of the families of the sons of Joseph, came near, and spake before Moses, and before the princes, the heads of the fathers` [houses] of the children of Israel:" — Numbers 36:1 (ASV)

And the chief fathers of the families. It might appear strange that God had given an imperfect law regarding succession. It could seem as if what will now be stated had not occurred to Him until Moses was reminded by the chief men of the families (of Machir)²⁰¹ that it was unjust for inheritances to be alienated. This alienation would have happened if the daughters of Zelophehad had married into other tribes, since their portion had fallen within the lot of the tribe of Manasseh.

For whatever fell into the hands of those from another tribe, was a reduction of that lot. Therefore, since God had recently made provision for preserving the rights of individuals, He now addresses the general advantage or loss.

What, then, can be the meaning of the objection that God only half considered what was right? In my opinion, He arranged His replies in such a way that He assigned to each one his rights only when He was asked. The daughters of Zelophehad came and demanded justice from Moses and the elders, and God complied with their prayers. Now the heads of the tribe came and raised the question concerning the loss they would incur from the alienation of the inheritances. Provision was then made that other tribes should not be enriched by their loss.

In short, while God could have spontaneously anticipated this, He preferred to grant it at the request of those who asked only for what was just and equitable. For it cannot be said that in this instance it happened, as it often does, that while everyone stubbornly maintains his own cause and is eager to advance his own interests, one question leads to another. For when God examined the case, He declared that both parties had only demanded what was right.

It follows, therefore, that God intentionally withheld His decisions until they naturally arose from the circumstances of the case. It is a common saying that the law makes no provision for things that rarely occur.²⁰² Thus, it would have been commonly supposed that this law was superfluous. Indeed, it would have somewhat detracted from the authority of Moses' teaching if he had dealt with this trifling matter, had circumstances not led to it.

Finally, God allowed Himself to be consulted familiarly regarding doubtful points of no primary importance, so that posterity might recognize His reply as a proof of His fatherly indulgence. Meanwhile, let us remember that if heavenly things are the subject of as much concern to us as earthly things were to the children of Manasseh, the rule we should follow will always be made clear to us.

²⁰¹ Added from Fr.

²⁰² “De his, quae frequenter fieri solent, non quae raro, leges fieri debent.” 1. 3. et sequentibus ff. de legib.; 1. 3. Digest. si pars haeredit, petatur; 1.28 ff. de judiciis; 1. ea quae 64, de regul. juris.