Thomas Aquinas Commentary Hebrews 11:1

"Now faith is assurance of [things] hoped for, a conviction of things not seen." — Hebrews 11:1 (ASV)

Above, the Apostle showed Christ’s superiority in many ways by preferring Him to the angels, to Moses, and to Aaron, and he advised the faithful to be united to Christ. Since this union consists primarily in faith and begins with faith—That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts (Ephesians 3:17)—the Apostle proceeds to commend this faith. He does three things: first, he describes faith; second, he gives various examples of it (verse 2); and third, he exhorts them to the things that pertain to faith (chapter 12).

He gives a definition of faith that is complete but obscure. Hence, it should be noted that to define any virtue perfectly, one must mention the specific matter it deals with and its end. This is because habits are recognized by their acts, and acts by their objects. Therefore, it is necessary to mention the act and its relationship to its object and end. For example, the definition of courage must mention its specific matter, namely, fears and aggressions, and its end, which is the public good. Now, since faith is a theological virtue, its object and end are the same: God. First, the Apostle mentions faith’s relationship to its end; second, he mentions its specific matter (verse 1b).

It should be noted that the act of faith is to believe, which is an act of the intellect directed to one thing by the command of the will. Hence, as Augustine says in The Predestination of the Saints, "to believe" is to think with assent. Therefore, the object of faith and the object of the will must coincide. The object of faith is the First Truth, in which the will's end—namely, happiness—consists. But this First Truth is present in one way on earth and in another way in heaven.

On earth, the First Truth is not possessed and, consequently, not seen. For as Augustine says in his Book of 83 Questions, in regard to things that are above the soul, to possess and to see are the same. Hence, these things are only hoped for: But hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man sees, why does he hope for? (Romans 8:24). Therefore, the First Truth—not seen but hoped for—is the end of the will on earth. Consequently, it is also the object of faith, because faith's end and object are the same.

The ultimate end of faith in heaven, toward which we strive by faith, is happiness. This happiness consists in the clear vision of God: This is eternal life: to know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent (John 17:3). This is the hope of believers: He has regenerated us unto a lively hope (1 Peter 1:3). Therefore, the end of faith on earth is the attainment of what is hoped for—namely, eternal happiness. This is why the Apostle says it is the substance of things hoped for.

A question arises: since faith comes before hope, why is it defined in terms of hope? It is customary to define the later by the former, not the other way around. The answer should be clear from what has already been said: the object and the end of faith are the same. Therefore, since the attainment of things hoped for is faith's end, it must also be its object, for a habit must be defined by the relationship of its act to its object.

The true and the good, though convertible in their substance when considered in themselves, differ in concept. Thus, they are related to each other in different ways, because the true is a good, and the good is true. Similarly, the intellect and the will—which are distinguished based on the distinction between the true and the good—have a different kind of relationship to each other. Insofar as the intellect apprehends truth, the true is considered a good; hence, the good is under the true. But insofar as the will moves, the true is under the good.

Therefore, in the order of knowing, the intellect is prior; but in the order of moving, the will is prior. Because the intellect is moved to the act of faith by the command of the will, the will is prior in the order of moving. Therefore, the prior is not being defined by the later. As stated, the definition of faith must mention the relationship of its act to its object, which is the same as its end. But the end and the good are the same, as Aristotle says in Physics II. And in the order of moving toward the good, the will—which is the subject of hope—is prior.

But why not say "of things to be loved" rather than "of things hoped for"? The reason is that charity is concerned with things whether they are present or absent. Since the unpossessed end is the object of faith, the Apostle says of things hoped for. It makes no difference that the thing hoped for is also the object of hope. This is because faith must be ordered toward an end that coincides with the object of those virtues that perfect the will, since faith itself involves the intellect being moved by the will.

Since faith is a single virtue—a single habit with a single object—why does the definition not say "of the thing hoped for" instead of things hoped for? I answer that happiness, while essentially one thing in itself (consisting in the vision of God), is the principle and root from which many good things are derived. These include, for example, the glorification of the body, companionship with the saints, and many other blessings. Therefore, to show that all these are objects of faith, the Apostle speaks in the plural.

The word "substance" in the definition can be explained in several ways. First, it can be understood causally, meaning that faith is a "substance" because it makes the things hoped for present in us. This happens in two ways. First, faith acts by meriting, as it were. By making one's intellect captive and submissive to the things of faith, a person merits to one day see the things he hopes for, since vision is the reward of faith. Second, faith acts by its very nature, bringing it about that what is believed to be in the future is somehow already possessed, provided one believes in God.

Alternatively, we can explain the word "substance" essentially, meaning that faith is the substance—that is, the essence—of things hoped for. This aligns with the Greek, where faith is defined as the hypostasis of things hoped for. The essence of happiness is nothing less than the vision of God: This is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent (John 17:3). As Augustine says in On the Trinity, "This contemplation is promised to us; it is the end of all our actions." Therefore, the full vision of God is the essence of happiness.

We see an analogy for this in the sciences. If a person wishes to learn a science, he must first accept its principles, believing them as they are delivered by the teacher. As stated in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, "a learner must believe." In those principles, the entire science is contained in some way, just as conclusions are contained in their principles and an effect is contained in its cause. Therefore, one who has the principles of a science, such as geometry, has its substance. If geometry were the substance of happiness, then a person who possessed its principles would, in a sense, have the substance of happiness.

Our faith, however, consists in believing that the blessed will see and enjoy God. Therefore, if we wish to reach that state, we must believe the principles of that divine knowledge. These principles are the articles of faith, which contain the summary of this knowledge, for the vision of the triune God is what makes us happy. This is a primary article of faith, and this is what we believe. Consequently, the Apostle says faith is the assurance (or substance) of things hoped for. It is as if to say: we shall be happy when we see face to face what we now see only obscurely, as in a mirror. As Paul writes, We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face (1 Corinthians 13:12). These words show the relationship of the act of faith to its end. Faith is ordered to things hoped for, serving as a beginning in which the whole is virtually contained, just as conclusions are contained in their principles.

Next, when the Apostle says faith is the conviction (or evidence) of things that appear not, he addresses the act of faith in regard to its specific matter. Although the act of faith relates to the will, as has been said, its proper subject is the intellect, because its object is truth, which properly pertains to the intellect.

There are different kinds of intellectual acts. Some intellectual habits, like understanding and science, involve complete certitude and a perfect grasp of what is known. For example, in the habit of understanding first principles, one who understands that "every whole is greater than its part" sees this and is certain. Both understanding and science produce certitude and a kind of vision. Other intellectual states, however, produce neither certitude nor vision, namely, doubt and opinion. Faith stands midway between these two categories.

As stated, faith produces assent in the intellect. This assent can be caused in two ways. First, the intellect can be moved to assent by the evidence of the object itself, which is either knowable in itself (as with first principles) or known through something else that is knowable in itself (as in the science of astronomy). Second, the intellect can assent to something not because of the evidence of the object. In this case, the object itself does not sufficiently move the intellect, which then either doubts (when there is no more evidence for one side than the other) or holds an opinion (when there is some reason for one side, but not enough to satisfy the intellect, leaving fear regarding the opposite side).

Faith, however, does not fit perfectly into either category. It lacks the direct evidence found in understanding and science, yet it also lacks the uncertainty found in doubt and opinion. Instead, faith fixes on one side with certainty and firm adherence through a voluntary choice. This choice rests on God's authority, by which the intellect is fixed, so that it clings firmly to the articles of faith and assents to them with the greatest certainty. Therefore, to believe is to know with assent.

Therefore, the specific matter of the habit of faith is things that appear not. For as Gregory says, seeing pertains to knowledge, not to faith. The act of faith is a certain adherence, which the Apostle calls evidence, taking the cause for the effect, because evidence is what produces belief about a doubtful matter. Alternatively, if we follow the etymology of the word for evidence (argumentum), which means "to argue the mind," then the Apostle is taking the effect for the cause, because the mind is compelled to assent by the certainty of the thing believed. Hence, faith is called the evidence of things that appear not, meaning it is a sure and certain apprehension of things it does not see.

If one were to summarize this, one could say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life begins in us, and which makes the intellect assent to things it does not see. It is clear, therefore, that the Apostle has defined faith completely, though not with immediate clarity. (Where this text reads evidence, another version has conviction, because on God's authority the intellect is convinced about things it does not see.)

This definition distinguishes faith from all other habits of the intellect. By calling it evidence, it is distinguished from opinion, doubt, and suspicion, because these three do not cause the intellect to adhere to anything firmly. By the words of things hoped for, it is distinguished from ordinary, non-saving faith that is not ordered toward eternal happiness. A proper definition, as in this case, makes a thing known and distinguishes it from all else.

However, it seems incorrect to define faith by things that appear not. For John 20:26 says, Thomas saw and believed. Furthermore, we believe that there is one God, a fact that can be demonstrated by philosophers. I answer that "faith" can be understood in two senses. In its proper sense, as is clear from the above, it is concerned with things not seen and not known. Since the certainty of a conclusion cannot be greater than that of the principle from which it is drawn, it follows that because the principles of faith are not self-evident, neither are its conclusions. Hence, the intellect does not assent to the conclusions of faith as to things known or seen.

In a more general sense, however, "faith" can refer to belief in things that are seen, which is how Augustine uses the term in his Gospel Questions. But the Apostle here is speaking of faith in the first, proper sense. Regarding Thomas, it must be said, as Gregory does, that he saw one thing and believed something else: he saw the humanity of Christ and believed in His divinity.

To the objection about demonstrated truths, the answer is that nothing prevents one thing from being seen by one person and believed by another. For example, what is not seen on earth is seen by the angels; therefore, what I believe, an angel sees. Similarly, what is known by demonstration to philosophers—for example, that God is one and incorporeal—must be believed by the unlearned, just as an unlearned person believes in an eclipse that an astronomer sees and understands. In such cases, "faith" is being used in a different sense. There are, however, some truths that absolutely transcend the knowledge possible in this present life. It is in regard to these that we have faith in the strict and proper sense.