Thomas Aquinas Commentary Romans 7

After showing that we are set free from sin through the grace of Christ, the Apostle now shows that through the same grace we are freed from slavery to the law.

In this regard, he does two things:

1. He states his proposition.
2. He excludes an objection, with the words what shall we say, then (Romans 7:7).

Regarding the first point, he does two things:

1. He shows that through the grace of Christ we are freed from the slavery of the law.
2. He shows that this liberation is useful, with the words that we may bring forth fruit to God.

Regarding the first of these, he does three things:

1. He makes a statement from which he argues to his proposition.
2. He clarifies it, with the words for the woman who has a husband.
3. He concludes, with the words therefore, my brethren.

The statement he makes is presented as something they already know. Hence he says, do you not know, brethren? as if to say, “You should not be ignorant of this.” As the Apostle also writes, But if any man does not know, he will not be known (1 Corinthians 14:38).

The reason they should not be ignorant is shown when he adds, for I speak to those who know the law.

But since the Romans were Gentiles and ignorant of the law of Moses, it seems that what is said here does not apply to them. Therefore, some have explained this as referring to the natural law, of which the Gentiles were not ignorant, as he said earlier: when the gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves (Romans 2:14).

According to this view, the phrase that the law has dominion over a man as long as he lives refers to the natural law within a person. This law “lives” as long as natural reason functions effectively, but it “dies” when natural reason succumbs to the passions: they have broken the everlasting covenant (Isaiah 24:5), that is, the covenant of the natural law.

However, this interpretation does not seem to agree with the Apostle’s intention, as he always has the law of Moses in mind when he speaks of “the law” without any modifying qualifications.

Therefore, it is better to say that the believers in Rome were not only Gentiles; there were many Jews among them. For instance, it says that Paul found in Corinth a certain Jew named Aquila, who had recently arrived from Italy, and Priscilla his wife, because Claudius had expelled all the Jews from Rome (Acts 18:2).

Thus, the law is binding on a person as long as he lives. For the law was given to direct a person in this life, as it says in the Psalm: he will instruct him in the way that he should choose (Psalms 25:12). Therefore, the obligation of the law is dissolved by death.

Next, he clarifies what he said with an example from the law of marriage, using the words for the woman who has a husband. He does two things:

1. He gives the example.
2. He clarifies it with a sign, using the words therefore, while.

Regarding the example, he first states how the obligation endures during life. He says, for the woman who has a husband (that is, who is under the power of a man) is bound by the law. This is from the divine law, which says, your husband shall rule over you (Genesis 3:16). She is bound to the law that obligates her to live with her husband: what God has joined together, let no man put asunder (Matthew 19:6).

This indissolubility of marriage is especially significant because it is a sacrament of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, or of the Word and human nature in the person of Christ: this is a great mystery, and I take it to mean Christ and the Church (Ephesians 5:32).

Second, he shows how the obligation is dissolved by death, saying, but if her husband dies, she is loosed from the law of her husband; that is, she is released from the law of marriage that bound her to him.

For since, as Augustine says in his book On Marriage and Concupiscence, marriage is a good for mortals, its obligation does not extend beyond this mortal life. For this reason, in the resurrection, when life will be immortal, they neither marry nor are given in marriage (Matthew 22:30).

From this it is clear that if a person were to die and be restored to life, as Lazarus was, the one who had been his wife is no longer his wife, unless he marries her again.

Against this, one might raise the objection from what is stated in Hebrews: women received their dead by resurrection (Hebrews 11:35). But one should realize that these women received back not their husbands but their sons, as did the woman in 1 Kings 17 through Elijah, and another in 2 Kings 4 through Elisha.

The case is different with sacraments that imprint a character, which is a consecration of the immortal soul. Every consecration endures as long as the consecrated thing lasts, as is clear in the consecration of a church or an altar. Therefore, if a baptized, confirmed, or ordained person were to die and rise again, he would not have to repeat these sacraments.

Then he clarifies his meaning with a sign, using the words therefore, while her husband. First, regarding the obligation of marriage that continues for the wife while her husband lives, the sign is that she will be called an adulteress, if she be with another man while her husband lives. This means if she joins another man as his wife: if a man divorces his wife and she goes from him and becomes another man’s wife, would not she be polluted and contaminated? (Jeremiah 3:1).

Second, he provides a sign that the obligation of marriage is dissolved by death, saying, but if her husband dies, she is delivered from the law, so that she is not an adulteress, if she be with another man. This means she is not an adulteress if she is carnally united to another man, particularly if she has married him: if the husband dies... she is free to be married to whom she wishes, only in the Lord (1 Corinthians 7:39).

This shows that second, third, or even fourth marriages are lawful in themselves, and not merely by dispensation, as Chrysostom seems to suggest when he says that just as Moses permitted a bill of divorce, so the Apostle permitted second marriages.

For if the marriage law is dissolved by death, there is no reason why the survivor may not marry again. The Apostle says, a bishop should be married only once (1 Timothy 3:2), not because second marriages are illicit, but because of the sacramental sign: for a bishop represents Christ, who is the one spouse of the one Church.

Then, with the words therefore, my brethren, he draws his main conclusion: you also have died to the law, by the body of Christ. This means that by becoming members of the body of Christ—dying and being buried with him, as stated earlier—you have died to the law. The obligation of the law ceases in you, so that you may belong to another, namely, Christ, in whom you have received a new life by rising with him. Therefore, you are bound not by the law of your former life but by the law of this new life.

This application might seem awkward. In the preceding example, the husband died and the woman was free to remarry, but here, the one released from the law is said to die.

However, if we consider it another way, there is a parallel. Since marriage is between two people, it makes no difference which one dies; in either case, the law of marriage is removed by death. Therefore, the obligation of the old law ceases by virtue of the death by which we die with Christ.

Then he shows the usefulness of this liberation with the words that we may bear fruit. In this regard, he does three things:

1. First, he mentions the benefit: that we may bear fruit to God. For if we have been made members of Christ and abide in him, we can bear fruit—that is, good works—for the honor of God: as the branch cannot bear fruit by itself, unless it abides in the vine (John 15:4).
2. Second, with the words for when we were in the flesh, he shows that this fruit was impeded when we were under the slavery of the law. To be “in the flesh” means to be subject to sinful desires, as he says elsewhere, But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit (Romans 8:9). Our sinful passions, which were provoked by the law, were at work in our members, moving them to sin: what causes wars and what causes fightings among you? Is it not your passions? (James 4:1). And this was in order to bear fruit for death, meaning to produce the fruit of death: sin when it is full-grown brings forth death (James 1:15).
3. Third, with the words but now we are loosed, he shows that this benefit is acquired by those freed from slavery to the law. He says we are now loosed from the law of death by the grace of Christ. This refers to the law of Moses, which is called “the law of death” either because it killed violators without mercy , or, better, because it provided the occasion for spiritual death: for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life (2 Corinthians 3:6).

He continues that this is the law in which we were detained, like servants held captive: before faith came we were confined under the law (Galatians 3:23). We have been freed so that we should serve in newness of spirit—that is, renewed in spirit by the grace of Christ: a new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you (Ezekiel 36:26). We are to serve not in the oldness of the letter, meaning not according to the old law, or not according to the old written code of sin that the letter of the law could not remove: I have grown weak in the midst of all my foes (Psalms 6:7).

1. After showing that through Christ’s grace we are freed from the slavery of the law, and that this liberation is useful, the Apostle now answers an objection that arises from the preceding discussion: namely, that the old law seems not to be good.

   In regard to this, he does two things.

   First, he resolves the objection through which it seems that the old law is not good.

   Second, he shows that the law is good, at the phrase for we know (Romans 7:14).

   In regard to the first point, he does two things.

   First, he sets out the objection concerning the law.

   Second, he resolves it, at the phrase wherefore the law indeed.

2. First, therefore, he says: I have said that sinful passions existed by means of the law and that it is a law of death. What follows from such statements? What shall we say, then? Shall we say that the law is sin?

   This can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the law teaches sin: the laws of the people are vain (Jeremiah 10:3), namely because they teach vanity. In another way, that the law is called sin because the one who gave the law sinned by decreeing such a law. These two follow from one another, because if the law teaches sin, the lawgiver sins by decreeing the law: Woe to them that make wicked laws (Isaiah 10:1). Now it seems that the law does teach sin, if sinful passions come through the law, and if the law leads to death.

3. Then when he says, God forbid, he resolves the previously mentioned objection.

   Concerning this, it should be noted that if the law per se and directly caused sinful passions or death, it would follow that the law is sin in either of the two ways mentioned; but this is not the case if the law were merely the occasion of sinful passions and death.

   In regard to this, he does two things.

   First, he shows what the law does per se.

   Second, he shows what follows from it as from an occasion, at the phrase but sin, taking occasion.

4. Concerning the first point, he does three things.

   First, he answers the question, saying, God forbid, namely, that the law is sin.

   For it does not teach sin: the law of the LORD is perfect (Psalms 19:7). Nor has the lawgiver sinned as though decreeing an unjust law: by me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things (Proverbs 8:15).

5. Second, at the phrase but I would not have known sin, he indicates what pertains per se to the law: namely, to make sin known and not to remove it.

   And that is what he says: but I would not have known sin, except through the law. As it is written, through the law comes knowledge of sin (Romans 3:20). This is clear if it is understood of the natural law, because a person distinguishes between good and evil through the natural law: He filled their heart with wisdom and showed them both good and evil . But here the Apostle seems to be speaking of the old law, which he signified above when he said, the oldness of the letter (Romans 7:6).

   One should say, therefore, that without the law, sin could be known insofar as it has a dishonorable character—that is, as something contrary to reason—but not insofar as it is an offense against God. For through the laws divinely decreed, a person learns that human sins displease God, since He forbids them and commands that they be punished.

6. Third, at the phrase for I would not have known concupiscence, he proves what he had said, saying, for I would not have known concupiscence, if the law did not say: You shall not covet.

   In regard to this, it should be noted that his statement, I would not have known sin, except through the law, could be interpreted as referring to the sinful act which the law brings to a person’s attention when it forbids it. This, of course, is true in some cases, for it is said, a woman shall not lie down with a beast (Leviticus 18:23). But that this is not the Apostle’s meaning is clear from what he says here. For no one is unaware of the act of concupiscence, since all experience it.

   Therefore, it must be interpreted as saying that, as was stated above, it is only through the law that sin is recognized as something subject to punishment and an offense against God. He uses concupiscence to prove this, because corrupt concupiscence is common to all sins. Hence a Gloss says, with Augustine, “here the Apostle chose a general sin,” that is, concupiscence. Therefore the law is good, because when it forbids concupiscence, it forbids all evils.

7. It might be supposed that concupiscence is a general sin insofar as it is understood as the desire for something illicit, which is essential to any sin. This is not the way Augustine called concupiscence a general sin, but because the root and cause of every sin is some special concupiscence. Hence a Gloss says that concupiscence is a general sin from which all sins come.

   For the Apostle quotes a precept from Exodus: You shall not covet your neighbor’s property (Exodus 20:17). This is the concupiscence involved in avarice, about which it is said: the love of money is the root of all evils (1 Timothy 6:10), because all things obey money (Ecclesiastes 10:19). Therefore, the concupiscence about which he is now speaking is a general evil, not with the commonality of a genus or species but with the commonality of causality.

   Nor is this contrary to what is stated in Sirach, that pride is the beginning of all sin . For pride is the beginning of sin on the side of turning away from God, but covetousness is the beginning of sins on the side of turning toward a changeable good.

8. But it can be said that the Apostle uses covetousness to clarify his proposition, because he wants to show that without the law, sin was not known in its aspect as an offense against God. This is particularly clear from the fact that the law forbids covetousness, which is not forbidden by human law. For God alone considers a person guilty for coveting with the heart: man sees those things that appear, but the LORD beholds the heart (1 Samuel 16:17). But the reason God’s law forbade coveting another’s property, which is taken by stealing, and another’s wife, who is violated by adultery, and not the coveting involved in other sins, is that the former sins involve a pleasure in the very act of coveting, which does not happen in other sins.

9. Then he shows what follows from the law by way of occasion, when he says, but sin, taking the occasion.

   First, he states his intention.

   Second, he clarifies it, at the phrase for without the law.

10. First, therefore, he says that sin, taking occasion by the commandment of the law forbidding sin, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence.

    By “sin” can be understood the devil, because he is the beginning of sin; and according to this, he works all kinds of covetousness in a person: He who commits sin is of the devil, for the devil has sinned from the beginning (1 John 3:8).

    But because the Apostle had not mentioned the devil here, it can be said that each actual sin, as apprehended in thought, produces in a person a desire for it, as it says in James: each one is tempted by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin (James 1:14).

11. But it is better to say that this refers to the sin he described above as entering this world through one man (Romans 5:12), namely, original sin. Before the grace of Christ, this sin is in people according to guilt and punishment. But with the coming of grace, its liability to punishment passes, although it remains with respect to its inclination, or habitual covetousness, which produces in a person every act of covetousness. This includes both the kinds of covetousness involved in various sins (for the covetousness in stealing is not the same as that in adultery) and the various degrees of covetousness as found in thought, pleasure, consent, and deed.

    But to produce this effect in a person, sin finds an occasion in the law. And that is what he says: taking occasion. This is either because with the coming of the precept the aspect of transgression is added, for where there is no law there is no transgression (Romans 4:15), or because desire for the forbidden sin increases, for the reasons given above.

12. It should be noted that he does not say that the law gave the opportunity for sin, but that sin itself found an opportunity by reason of the law.

    For one who gives an opportunity scandalizes and, as a consequence, sins. This happens when someone commits an unrighteous act by which his neighbor is offended or takes scandal; for example, if someone frequents places of evil even with no evil intention. Hence he says below: but decide never to put a stumbling block or hindrance in the way of a brother (Romans 14:13). But if someone does a just act—for example, if he gives alms—by which someone else is scandalized, he is not giving an opportunity for scandal. Hence he neither gives scandal nor sins, but the one who is scandalized finds the act an opportunity for taking scandal and sins. Thus, therefore, the law did what is right, because it forbade sin; hence it gave no opportunity for sinning, but man takes opportunity from the law. For this reason, it follows that the law is not sin, but rather that sin is on the part of man.

    Consequently, sinful passions, which pertain to the covetousness involved in sin, do not exist by virtue of the law as though the law produced them, but sin causes them, taking occasion from the law. And for the same reason it is called a law of death, not because the law produces death, but because sin produces death by finding occasion in the law.

    Now in the same sense, the words can be arranged another way to say that sin produced all concupiscence through the command of the law, and this by taking occasion from the command; but the first exposition is simpler and better.

13. Then when he says, for without the law, he clarifies what he had said, and he does this through the experience of the effect.

    First, he mentions the effect.

    Second, he repeats the cause, at the phrase for sin.

    In regard to the first, he does three things:

    First, he describes conditions before the law.

    Second, he describes conditions under the law, at the phrase but when the commandment came.

    Third, from a comparison of the two conditions, he concludes with the outcome of the law, at the phrase and the commandment that was ordained to life.

14. First, therefore, he says, but sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. This is obvious from the fact that for without the law sin was dead. This is not as though sin did not exist, because through one man sin entered this world before the law (Romans 5:12), but in the sense that it was dead either with respect to a person’s knowledge, who did not know that certain things forbidden by the law were sins (for example, covetousness), or because it was dead as compared to what it was later. For it did not have as much power to lead people to death as it had later, when it took opportunity from the law. For that is considered dead whose strength is weakened: mortify your members which are on earth (Colossians 3:5). This, therefore, was the condition before the law as far as sin was concerned.

15. But the condition as far as man was concerned is indicated when he says, and I lived some time without the law.

    This can also be understood in two ways. In one way, with respect to the fact that it seemed to the person that he was alive, so long as he did not know that sin was that by reason of which he was dead: you have the name of being alive, but you are dead (Revelation 3:1). Or in another way, this is said in comparison to the death which followed by occasion of the law. For those who sin less are said to be alive in comparison to those who sin more.

16. Then he describes conditions under the law, when he says, but when the commandment came.

    First, in regard to sin, he says: but when the commandment came—that is, after the law was decreed—sin revived. This can be understood in two ways. In one way, with respect to the knowledge of man, who began to know that sin existed in him, which he did not know before: after I was instructed, I struck my thigh; I was ashamed and confounded (Jeremiah 31:19). He says, revived, because in paradise man had full knowledge of sin, although he did not have it through experience. Or, in another way, sin revived as to its power, because after the law was given, the opportunity was given for the power of sin to increase: the power of sin is the law (1 Corinthians 15:56).

17. Second, with respect to man himself; hence he says, and I died. This can also be understood in two ways. In one way, as referring to a person’s knowledge, so that I died means that I knew myself to be dead. In another way, in comparison to the previous state, so that the sense is: I died, that is, I was more bound to death than before. Hence what was said to Moses and Aaron is somewhat true: you have killed the LORD’s people (Numbers 16:13).

18. Then he concludes from the comparison between the two states the outcome of the law, saying that the commandment that was ordained to life... was found—according to the intention of the lawgiver, and also insofar as it pertains to the integrity and devotion of the one subject to the mandate: I gave them my statutes and showed them my ordinances, by whose observance man shall live (Ezekiel 20:11)—proved to be an occasion unto death to me. This was through the sin which existed in the person: his food is turned in his stomach; it is the gall of asps within him (Job 20:14).

19. Then when he says, for sin, he repeats the cause as though intending to clarify it by the outcome of the law, saying: this happened—namely, that the commandment which promised life proved to be death—for sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me through the covetousness it produced in me. Beauty has deceived you, and lust has perverted your heart (Daniel 13:56), and by it, namely, the commandment, sin took occasion to kill me: the letter kills (2 Corinthians 3:6).

20. Then when he says, wherefore the law, he reaches the main conclusion: namely, that the law is not only not sin but furthermore is good, making sin to be known and forbidding it.

    First, he concludes with respect to the whole law, saying: as is clear from the preceding discussion, the law indeed is holy. The law of the LORD is without blemish (Psalms 19:7); we know that the law is good (1 Timothy 1:8).

    Second, with respect to the particular commandments of the law, he says: and the commandment of the law is holy in regard to the ceremonial precepts by which people are directed in the worship of God—be holy, because I am holy (Leviticus 20:7); and just, in regard to the judicial precepts by which a person is ordered to his neighbor in the proper way—the ordinances of the LORD are true and just altogether (Psalms 19:9); and good, in regard to the moral precepts—The law of your mouth is better to me than thousands of gold and silver pieces (Psalms 119:72). Yet, because all the commandments direct us to God, he called the whole law holy.

21. Then, when he says, did that then which is good, he raises a question in regard to the effect of the law.

    First, he poses the question, saying, did that then which is good—namely, in itself—bring death unto me, that is, act as a per se cause of death? For someone could falsely gather this from what he stated above, namely, that the commandment that was ordained to life... was found to be unto death to me.

22. Second, he answers negatively, saying, God forbid. For that which in itself is good and life-giving cannot be the cause of evil and death, because A good tree cannot bear evil fruit (Matthew 7:18).

23. Third, at the phrase but sin, he shows that what he is now saying is in agreement with what he had said above. For the commandment itself does not bring death; but sin, finding occasion in the commandment, brings death.

    And that is what he says: but sin, that it may appear sin, through the good of the law, wrought death in me. That is, through the commandment of the law, because the law is good by the very fact that it brings knowledge of sin. And this happens by way of occasion, as it makes sin manifest.

24. This does not mean that sin worked death through the law, as though there was no death without the law. For it was stated above that death reigned from Adam to Moses (Romans 5:14), that is, before the law was given. This should be understood to mean that sin worked death through the law, because the condemnation of death was increased when the law came.

    And this is what he says: I say that the working of sin is death through good, that sin, by the commandment, might become sinful. This is because, on occasion, it makes one sin on account of the precept of the law. And this happens exceedingly, either because the liability for transgression grew or because the inclination to sin increased with the coming of the law’s prohibitions.

    As stated above, sin here means the devil, or rather the inclination to sin.

1. After showing that the law is neither evil nor the cause of an evil effect, the Apostle now proves that the law is good.

   In this regard, he does two things:

   First, he proves its goodness from the very opposition to good found in man—an opposition the law cannot take away.

   Second, he shows what can take away this opposition, beginning with the word unhappy (Romans 7:24).

   Regarding the first point, he does three things:

   First, he states his proposition.

   Second, he proves it, beginning with for that which I work.

   Third, he draws a conclusion, beginning with I find then a law (Romans 7:21).

   Regarding the first of these, he does two things:

   First, he asserts the goodness of the law.

   Second, he describes man’s condition, beginning with but I am carnal.

2. First, therefore, he says: we have stated that the law is holy. We said this because we, who are wise in divine matters, know that the law—that is, the old law—is spiritual. This means it is in harmony with man’s spirit: the law of the Lord is stainless (Psalms 19:7). Alternatively, it is spiritual because it was given by the Holy Spirit, who is called the finger of God in the Scriptures: if by the finger of God I cast out demons (Luke 11:20). Hence it is said: he gave Moses two tablets of stone, written with the finger of God (Exodus 31:18).

   Yet the new law is not only called spiritual but is called the law of the Spirit (Romans 8:2), because it is not only given by the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit also imprints it on the heart in which He dwells.

3. Then he indicates man’s condition when he says, but I am carnal.

   This passage can be interpreted in two ways. One way is to see the Apostle speaking in the person of a man existing in sin. This is how Augustine explained it in his book, On 83 Diverse Questions. But later, in a book against Julian, he explained it as though the Apostle were speaking in his own person, that is, as a man in the state of grace.

   Let us, therefore, continue by showing how these words and those that follow can be explained under both interpretations, although the second explanation is better.

4. The first statement, but I am carnal, is interpreted so that the word I stands for human reason, which is the chief part of a person. For this reason, each person seems to be his own reason or intellect, just as a city seems to be its ruler, so that whatever the ruler does, the city is said to do.

5. A person is called carnal because his reason is carnal. Reason is called carnal in two ways. First, because it is submissive to the flesh and consents to the things the flesh urges: for while there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh? (1 Corinthians 3:3). In this sense, it is understood of a person not yet healed by grace. Second, reason is said to be carnal because it is under attack from the flesh: the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit (Galatians 5:17). In this sense, even the reason of a person in the state of grace is said to be carnal. In both cases, it is carnal on account of sin; hence he adds, sold under sin.

6. It should be noted that the carnality that implies a rebellion of the flesh against the spirit arises from the sin of the first parent, because this pertains to the inclination to sin derived from that original sin. However, the carnality that implies the submission of reason to the flesh arises not only from original sin but also from actual sin, through which a person, by obeying the desires of the flesh, makes himself a slave of the flesh. Hence he adds: sold under sin, namely, the sin of the first parent or of oneself.

   He says sold because the sinner sells himself into the slavery of sin as payment for fulfilling his own will: for your iniquities you were sold (Isaiah 50:1).

7. Then, when he says, for that which I work, he clarifies what he had stated:

   First, that the law is spiritual.

   Second, that man is carnal, sold under sin, beginning with now then it is no more I.

   Regarding the first point, he does two things:

   First, he presents a proof.

   Second, he draws a conclusion, beginning with if then I do that which I will not.

   The proof is based on man’s infirmity, which he first asserts and then proves, beginning with for the good which I will.

8. The proof is based on human weakness, which is revealed by the fact that a person does what he knows should not be done. Hence it is said: for that which I work, I do not understand, that is, I do not approve that it should be done.

   This can be understood in two ways. First, it can refer to a person subject to sin, who understands in general that sin should not be committed but, overcome by the devil's suggestion, by passion, or by the inclination of a perverse habit, commits it anyway. Therefore, he is said to do what he knows should not be done, acting against his conscience, just like the servant who knew his master’s will but did not act according to his will (Luke 12:47).

   Second, it can be understood of one in the state of grace. He does evil not by performing the deed or consenting with his mind, but only by desiring it through a passion in the sensitive appetite. That desire escapes the reason or intellect because it arises before the intellect’s judgment. Once the judgment is made, the desire is impeded. Therefore, it is significant that he does not say, "I understand it is not to be done," but I do not understand. This is because such a desire arises before the intellect has deliberated or perceived it: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh (Galatians 5:17).

9. Next, when he says, for I do not that good, he proves what he had said by division and by effect.

   First, he makes a division between not doing good and doing evil, because even a person who does not do good is said to commit sin—that is, a sin of omission—when he says, for that which I work.

   On the other hand, where he says, I do not understand, he proves it through the effect; for since the intellect moves the will, willing is its effect, which is to understand.

10. Regarding the omission of good, therefore, he says, for I do not that good which I will.

    This can be understood in one way of a man in the state of sin. In that case, I do should be understood as a complete action performed outwardly with the consent of reason, whereas I will refers not to a complete act of will commanding the deed, but to an incomplete willing by which people want good in general. They have a correct judgment about good in general, yet this judgment is perverted by a bad habit or a perverse passion, with the result that the will goes wrong when it comes to a particular case and does not do what it knows in a general way should be done and would want to do.

    In another way, it is understood of a man healed by grace. In that case, conversely, I will refers to a complete act of willing that lasts through the act of choosing a particular deed, whereas I do refers to an incomplete action that has gone no further than the sense appetite and has not reached the stage of consent. For a man in the state of grace wants to preserve his mind from wicked desires, but he fails to accomplish this good on account of the disorderly movements of desire that arise in the sensitive appetite. This is similar to what he says in Galatians: so that you do not do all that you will (Galatians 5:17).

11. Second, regarding the perpetration of evil, he says: but the evil which I hate, that I do. If this is understood of the sinner, I hate means an imperfect hatred by which every person naturally hates evil, while I do means an action completely performed in keeping with reason’s consent. For that general hatred of evil is frustrated in a particular choice by the inclination of a habit or passion.

    But if it is understood of a person in the state of grace, I do means an incomplete action that has gone no further than existing as a desire in the sensitive appetite. I hate refers to a complete hatred, by which one continues hating evil until its final rejection: I hate them with a perfect hatred (Psalms 139:22), namely, evil men, inasmuch as they are sinners. As it is written: while the laws were very well observed because of the piety of the high priest Onias and his hatred of wickedness .

12. Then when he says, now if I do, he concludes from the previously mentioned condition of man that the law is good, saying, now if I do that which I will not. Whichever of the aforementioned interpretations is taken, by the very fact that I hate evil, I consent to the law, that it is good, because it forbids the evil that I naturally do not want.

    For it is clear that man’s inclination, in keeping with reason, to will good and flee from evil is in accord with nature or grace, and each is good. Hence, the law also, which agrees with this inclination by commanding what is good and forbidding what is evil, is good for the same reason: I give you good precepts; do not forsake my teaching (Proverbs 4:2).

13. Then, when he says, now then it is no more I, he proves what he had said about man’s condition, namely, that he is carnal and sold under sin.

    In this regard, he does three things:

    First, he states his proposition.

    Second, he proves it, beginning with for I know.

    Third, he draws a conclusion, beginning with if then I do that which I will not.

14. That man is carnal and sold under sin, as being, in a way, a slave of sin, is clear from the fact that he does not act but is led by sin. For a free man acts of himself and is not led by another.

    Therefore, he says: I have said that I consent to the law as far as my intellect and will are concerned, but when I act against the law, it is no more I that do it—that is, do what is against the law—but sin that dwells in me. So it is evident that I am a slave of sin, inasmuch as sin, by exercising its dominion over me, does it.

15. This is easy to understand of a man in the state of grace. The fact that he desires something evil, as far as the sensitive appetite pertaining to the flesh is concerned, does not proceed from the work of reason but from the inclination to sin. A person is said to do what his reason does, because man is what he is according to his reason. Hence, the movements of concupiscible desire, which are not from reason but from the inclination to sin, are not done by the man but by the inclination to sin, which is here called "sin": Whence wars and fightings among you? Is it not your passions that are at war in your members? (James 4:1).

    But this cannot properly be understood of a man in sin, because his reason consents to sin; therefore, he himself commits it. Hence Augustine and a Gloss say: "Greatly deceived is the man who consents to the desires of the flesh and decides to do what they desire and then thinks he can say of himself: I am not doing this."

16. However, there is a way, although forced, to understand this even of a sinner.

    An action is mainly attributed to the principal agent acting by virtue of its own proper characteristic, not to an agent acting by virtue of a characteristic proper to something else by which it is moved. But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in light of what is proper to it, is not inclined to evil, but only insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire. Therefore, the doing of evil, which reason does inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed principally to reason (which is understood here to be the man), but rather to the desire or habit by which reason is inclined to evil.

    It should be noted that sin is said to dwell in man, not as though sin were some reality—since it is a privation of good—but to indicate the permanence of this kind of defect in man.

17. Then, when he says, for I know, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits.

    First, he presents the middle term proving the proposition.

    Second, he explains the middle term, beginning with for to will.

18. First, therefore, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil that man commits. This proof is clear when the words are referred to a man in the state of grace, who has been freed from sin by the grace of Christ (Romans 6:22). Therefore, as for a person in whom Christ’s grace does not dwell, he has not yet been freed from sin. But the grace of Christ does not dwell in the flesh, but in the mind. Hence it is stated below that if Christ is in us, the body is indeed dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justice (Romans 8:10). Therefore, sin, which the desire of the flesh produces, still rules in the flesh.

    For he takes flesh here to include the sensitive powers. The flesh is thus distinguished from the spirit and fights against it, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite tends toward the contrary of what reason seeks, as it says in Galatians: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit (Galatians 5:17).

19. He says, therefore: we have said that in me, even though healed by grace, sin works; but this must be understood of me according to the flesh along with the sensitive appetite. For I know through reason and experience that the good—namely, the good of grace by which I have been reformed—does not dwell in me.

    But lest this be understood to include reason in the manner explained above, he adds: that is to say, in my flesh. For in me, that is, in my heart, this good does dwell, for it says in Ephesians: that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith (Ephesians 3:17).

20. This makes it clear that this passage does not favor the Manicheans, who claim the flesh is not good according to its nature and, consequently, not a good creature of God. On the contrary, it is written: everything created by God is good (1 Timothy 4:4). For the Apostle is not discussing a good of nature but the good of grace, by which we are freed from sin.

21. If this passage referred to a man existing under sin, it would be superfluous to add, that is to say, in my flesh, because in a sinner the good of grace dwells neither in the flesh nor in the mind. A forced interpretation would explain this passage by saying that sin, which is the privation of grace, is somehow derived from the flesh to the mind.

22. Then he clarifies what he had said, when he says for to will:

    First, from man’s capabilities.

    Second, from his action which proves his capability, beginning with for the good which I will.

23. Man’s capability is described first in regard to willing, which seems to be in man’s power. Hence he says, for to will is present with me, that is, it is near to me, as if it were within my power. For as Augustine says, nothing is so much within man’s power as his will.

    Second, he describes man’s capability, or rather his difficulty in achieving an effect, when he says, but to accomplish good, I cannot find, that is, I do not find it within my power. As it says in Proverbs: it is the part of man to prepare the soul (Proverbs 16:1); and, the heart of a man disposes his way, but the Lord directs his steps (Proverbs 16:9).

24. This passage of Paul seems to favor the Pelagians, who said that the start of a good work is from us, inasmuch as we will the good. And this is what the Apostle seems to say: but to accomplish good, I cannot find.

    However, he rejects this interpretation in Philippians: for God is at work in you both to will and to do (Philippians 2:13).

25. Therefore, the fact that to will is present with me, once I have been healed by grace, is due to the work of divine grace. Through this grace, I not only will the good but also do some good, because I resist concupiscence and, led by the spirit, act against it. But I do not find it within my power to accomplish that good so as to exclude concupiscence entirely. This indicates that the good of grace does not reside in the flesh, because if it did, then just as I have the faculty of willing the good because of grace dwelling in the mind, so I would have the faculty of accomplishing the good by virtue of grace residing in the flesh.

    But if this refers to a man existing under sin, then it could be explained so that to will is taken for an incomplete act of willing, which, from the impulse of nature, is good in some who sin. But to will is present to man—that is, it lies next to him—as if it is weak, unless grace bestows on the will the ability for perfection.

26. Then when he says, for the good which I will, I do not, he clarifies what he had said by citing man’s action, which is a sign and effect of human capability. For man does not have the strength to accomplish good, because he does not do the good he wants but does the evil he does not want. This has been explained earlier.

27. Then, when he says, now if I do that which I will not, he returns to what he had previously proposed, saying, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. This, too, has been explained earlier.

    But it should be noted that by using the same middle term, that is, which I will not, the Apostle draws two conclusions he had proposed above: first, the goodness of the law, when he said, now if I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good; and second, the dominion of sin in man, when he says here, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. The first of these conclusions pertains to his statement that the law is spiritual; the second pertains to the statement, but I am carnal, sold under sin. He draws the first conclusion, about the goodness of the law, from that middle term based on the phrase I do not will, because his mind does not want what the law forbids, which shows that the law is good. But based on the phrase that I do, he concludes that sin, which functions against reason’s will, holds sway over man.

1. After showing that the law is good because it is consistent with reason, the Apostle now draws two conclusions based on the two things he had stated. The second conclusion is at but I see another law.

   In regard to the first, he does two things:

   1. He draws a conclusion from what he had said.
   2. He offers a sign to clarify it, at for I am delighted.

2. Now, he had stated two things. The first was that the law is spiritual (Romans 7:14), from which he concludes: I find then a law, that when I have a will to do good. This means he finds by experience a law consistent with that of Moses. There is an agreement between the law of Moses and his reason, by which he approves the good and detests evil, just as that law commands the good and forbids evil: the word is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may do it (Deuteronomy 30:14).

   In this way, it was necessary that evil is present with me. That is, sin or the inclination to sin lies next to his reason, as though dwelling in his flesh: guard the doors of your mouth from her who lies in your bosom—that is, from the flesh (Micah 7:5).

3. Then he presents a sign to show that the law agrees with reason, when he says, for I am delighted. For no one delights in anything except what agrees with him. But a person, according to his reason, delights in the law of God; therefore, the law of God agrees with reason.

   This is what he says: for I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inner man. This "inner man" refers to reason or the mind. It is not called this because the soul is formed in the shape of a man, as Tertullian supposed, or because the soul alone is man, as Plato said that man is a soul using a body. Rather, it is because what is most important in a person is called "man," as was explained above.

   p>In a person, what is more important regarding appearance is outward—namely, the body, formed in such a way that it is called the "outward man." But regarding the truth, what is more important is within—namely, the mind or reason, which is here called the "inner man." As it is written, how sweet to my taste are your words (Psalms 119:103); and, having for our comfort the holy books that are in our hands .

4. Then, when he says, but I see, he presents the other conclusion, which corresponds to his previous statement that I am carnal (Romans 7:14).

   The conclusion is this: but I see another law in my members. This is the inclination to sin, and it can be called a "law" for two reasons:

   1. Because of its effect. For just as the law induces one to do good, so this inclination induces one to sin.
   2. Because of its cause.

5. Since the inclination to sin is a punishment for sin, it has a twofold cause. One cause is sin itself, which has mastered the sinner and imposed its law on him—that is, the inclination to sin—just as a master imposes his law on a conquered slave.

   The other cause of this inclination is God, who imposed this punishment on sinful humanity: that our lower powers do not obey reason. In this sense, the very disobedience of the lower powers constitutes the inclination to sin and is called a law, since it was introduced by the law of divine justice. This is similar to how the sentence of a just judge has the force of law: and this has been done from that day forward, and was since made a statute, and an ordinance, and as a law in Israel (1 Samuel 30:25).

6. This law is found in the sensitive appetite as its source, but it is spread over all the members that play a role for concupiscent desire in sinning: just as you once yielded your members to serve impurity and every iniquity (Romans 6:19). This is why he says, in my members.

   Now, this law has two effects in a person. The first is that it resists reason. This is why he says, fighting against the law of my mind. This refers to the law of Moses, which is called "the law of the mind" since it agrees with the mind, or with the natural law, which is also called "the law of the mind" because it is naturally present in the mind: they show that what the law requires is written in their hearts (Romans 2:15). Concerning this resistance, it is said: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit (Galatians 5:17).

   The second effect is that it makes a person a slave. This is why he says, and captivating me, or leading me captive according to another text, in the law of sin that is in my members. This means "in myself," following the Hebrew custom of speech in which a noun is used in place of a pronoun.

   The law of sin makes a person captive in two ways. It makes the sinner captive through consent and action, but it makes the person in grace captive through the movement of concupiscent desire. It is said of this captivity: when the Lord led back the captives of Zion (Psalms 126:1).

7. Then, when he says, unhappy man that I am, he deals with liberation from the law of sin and does three things:

   1. He poses a question.
   2. He answers it, at the grace of God.
   3. He draws a conclusion, at therefore, I myself.

   In regard to the first point, he does two things.

8. First, he declares his misery when he says: unhappy man that I am. This wretchedness is the result of sin dwelling in a person: either in the flesh only, as in the righteous person, or also in the mind, as in the sinner. As it is written, sin makes nations miserable (Proverbs 14:34); and, I am become miserable, and am bowed down even to the end (Psalms 37:7).

9. Second, he asks: who will deliver me from this body of death? This question seems to express the desire voiced in the Psalm: bring my soul out of prison (Psalms 142:7).

   Yet, it should be remembered that in a person's body, we can consider two aspects. First is the very nature of the body, which is in harmony with the soul. It is not from this that he desires to be separated: we do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed over (2 Corinthians 5:4). Second, we can also consider the corruptible body which is a load upon the soul .

   Therefore, it is significant that he says: from this body of death.

10. Then he responds to the question with the words, the grace of God. For a person cannot be freed from the corruption of the body, or even of the soul, by his own power—even though his reason agrees with the fight against sin. He can be freed only by the grace of Christ, as it says in John: so if the Son makes you free, you are free indeed (John 8:36).

    Therefore, he says, the grace of God will free me, and it is given by Jesus Christ: grace and truth came through Jesus Christ (John 1:17).

11. This grace liberates from "the body of this death" in two ways. First, it liberates so that the corruption of the body does not dominate the soul and draw it into sin. Second, it liberates so that the corruption of the body is taken away entirely.

    Regarding the first way, it is fitting for the sinner to say: grace has freed me from the body of this death, meaning from the sin into which the soul is led by the body's corruption. But the righteous person has already been freed to that extent. Therefore, it is fitting for him to speak of the second way: the grace of God has freed me from the body of this death, so that in his body there is neither the corruption of sin nor of death. This will happen at the resurrection.

12. Then he draws a conclusion from the previous words, which follows in different ways depending on how they are explained, when he says, therefore, I myself.

    If the words are explained as spoken by a sinner, the conclusion is drawn in the following way: It has been said that the grace of God has freed me from the body of this death, so that I am not led into sin by it. Therefore, once I have been freed, I myself serve the law of God with the mind, but with the flesh, the law of sin. This "law of sin" remains in my flesh as an inclination to sin, by which the desires of the flesh are against the spirit.

    But if the words are understood as spoken by a righteous person, the conclusion is drawn in this way: The grace of God, by Jesus Christ has freed me from the body of this death, so that the corruption of sin and death is not in me. Therefore, I myself—one and the same person before being freed—serve the law of God with the mind by consenting to it, but with the flesh, the law of sin, since my flesh is moved to concupiscent desire according to the law of the flesh.