Thomas Aquinas Commentary Romans 9:14-18

"What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, For this very purpose did I raise thee up, that I might show in thee my power, and that my name might be published abroad in all the earth. So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will be hardeneth." — Romans 9:14-18 (ASV)

1. After showing that by God’s choice one person is preferred to another—not based on works but on the grace of the one calling—the Apostle now inquires into the justice of this choice.

   He proceeds in three steps:

   1. First, he raises a question.
   2. Second, he answers it, beginning with, God forbid! For he says to Moses.
   3. Third, he raises an objection to his own solution, starting with, You will say to me then, “Why does he still find fault?”

2. First, therefore, he says: It has been stated that God chose one and rejected the other without any preceding merit. What shall we say then? Does this allow us to conclude that there is injustice on God’s part?

   It seems so, because justice requires that equals be treated equally. But when differences arising from merit are removed, all people are equal. Therefore, if God dispensed unequally by choosing one and rejecting another without considering their merits, it seems there is injustice in him. This would contradict what is said in Deuteronomy: God is faithful and without any iniquity (Deuteronomy 32:4), and in the Psalms: Righteous are you, O LORD, and your judgments are right (Psalms 119:137).

3. It should be noted that Origen fell into error while trying to solve this objection.

   In his book On First Principles, he claims that from the beginning God made only spiritual creatures, and all were equal, so that he could not be charged with injustice for any inequality. Later, differences among these creatures arose from differences in merit. Some of those spiritual creatures turned to God by love—some more and some less—and on this basis the various orders of angels were distinguished. Others turned away from God—some more and some less—and on this basis they were bound to bodies, whether noble or lowly. Some were bound to heavenly bodies, some to the bodies of demons, and some to the bodies of men. Accordingly, the reason for creating and distinguishing bodily creatures is the sin of spiritual creatures. But this contradicts what is said in Genesis: God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good (Genesis 1:31). This verse helps us understand that goodness was the cause of producing bodily creatures, as Augustine says in The City of God.

4. Therefore, we must set aside this opinion and see how the Apostle solves the problem when he says, God forbid!

   In this regard, he does two things:

   1. First, he solves the problem with respect to the election of the saints.
   2. Second, he addresses the hatred and rejection of the wicked, beginning with, For the Scripture says.

   Regarding the first point, he also does two things:

   1. First, he presents the scriptural text from which the solution comes.
   2. Second, he draws a conclusion from it, starting with, So then it depends not on him.

5. The text he cites is from Exodus, where the Lord said to Moses: I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy (Exodus 33:19). The Apostle, however, quotes it according to the Septuagint version, saying: For he says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.” The meaning is that all our blessings are ascribed to God’s mercy, as it says in Isaiah: I will remember the steadfast love of the LORD, the praises of the LORD, according to all that the LORD has granted us (Isaiah 63:7); and in Lamentations: The steadfast love of the LORD never ceases; his compassion never fails (Lamentations 3:22).

6. The text Paul cites is explained in two ways in a Gloss, so that it solves the question and the objection in two ways.

   First: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, meaning, on the one who is worthy of mercy. To amplify this, he repeats: I will have compassion on whom I have compassion, meaning, on whom I judge worthy of compassion, as it says in a psalm: The LORD has compassion on those who fear him (Psalms 103:13).

   It follows from this that although God imparts his blessings from mercy, he is nevertheless excused from injustice, for he gives to those who should receive and does not give to one who should not, according to the correctness of his judgment.

7. However, having mercy on one who is worthy can be understood in two ways. One way is that a person is counted worthy of mercy on account of preexisting works in this life, though not in another life, as Origen supposed. This belongs to the Pelagian heresy, which taught that God’s grace is given to men according to their merits.

   But this cannot stand, because, as has been stated, good merits themselves are from God and are the effects of predestination.

8. There is another way in which one is considered worthy of mercy: not on account of merits preceding grace, but on account of merits subsequent to grace. For example, God gives a person grace, having planned from eternity to give that grace which he foresaw would be used well.

   According to this, the Gloss is saying that God has mercy on him who should be given mercy. Hence it says: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy—that is, by calling and bestowing grace, I will have mercy on him to whom I know beforehand that I will show mercy, knowing that he will be converted and abide with me.

   But it seems that not even this is a suitable explanation. For it is clear that nothing which is an effect of predestination can be taken as a reason for predestination, even if it is considered as existing in God’s foreknowledge. This is because the reason for predestination is presupposed to predestination, whereas the effect is included in it.

   But every benefit God bestows on a person for their salvation is an effect of predestination. Furthermore, God’s benefits extend not only to the infusion of grace, by which a person is made righteous, but also to its use. Just as in natural things God not only causes their forms but also all the movements and activities of those forms—since God is the source of all movement, such that when he ceases to act, no movement or activity proceeds from those forms. Sanctifying grace and the accompanying virtues in the soul are related to their use as a natural form is related to its activity. Hence, it is said: O LORD, you have accomplished all our works for us (Isaiah 26:12).

9. Aristotle proves this in a particular way when he discusses the works of the human will.

   Since a person is open to opposites—for example, to sitting or not sitting—the choice must be resolved by something else. This is done by deliberation, which is followed by choosing one option over the other. But again, since a person has the power to deliberate or not to deliberate, something must move him to deliberate. Since this cannot proceed infinitely, there must be some external principle superior to man which moves him to deliberate—and this principle is none other than God.

   In this way, then, the very use of grace is from God. But this does not mean that sanctifying grace is superfluous, any more than natural forms are superfluous, even though God works in all things. As it is said: Wisdom orders all things sweetly , because through their forms all things are inclined spontaneously, as it were, to that to which they are ordered by God.

   Consequently, it is impossible that the merits which follow grace are the reason for showing mercy or for predestination. The only reason is God’s will, according to which he mercifully delivers certain ones.

   It is clear that distributive justice applies to things given as a debt; for example, if some people have earned wages, more should be given to those who have done more work. But it has no place in things given spontaneously and out of mercy. For example, if a person meets two beggars and gives one an alms, he is not unjust but merciful. Similarly, if a person has been offended equally by two people and he forgives one but not the other, he is merciful to the one, just to the other, but unjust to neither.

   Since all people are born subject to damnation on account of the sin of the first parent, those whom God delivers by his grace, he delivers by his mercy alone. And so he is merciful to those whom he delivers, just to those whom he does not deliver, but unjust to none.

   Thus, the Apostle solves the question with a text that ascribes everything to divine mercy.

10. Yet it should be noted that God’s mercy is viewed in three aspects:

    1. First, according to predestination, by which he proposed from all eternity to deliver certain ones: The mercy of the LORD is from everlasting to everlasting (Psalms 103:17).
    2. Second, according to his calling and justifying, by which he saves people in time: He saved us, according to his own mercy (Titus 3:5).
    3. Third, according to the bestowal of glory, when he frees from all misery: Who crowns you with steadfast love and mercy (Psalms 103:4).

    Therefore, he says: I will have mercy (by calling and justifying) on whom I have mercy (by predestining and having compassion), and finally by crowning with glory him on whom I have mercy by calling and justifying.

    This interpretation is more in keeping with the version before me: I will be gracious to whom I will, and I will be merciful to whom it shall please me, where divine mercy is clearly ascribed not to merits but solely to the divine will.

11. Then he draws his conclusion from the authority he cited, when he says, So then it depends not on him.

    This conclusion can be understood in a number of ways. One way is this: so a person’s salvation is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs—that is, it is not owed to anyone through any willing of their own or any outward action. This running is spoken of in 1 Corinthians: So run that you may obtain it (1 Corinthians 9:24). But of God who shows mercy—that is, it proceeds from the sole mercy of God. What follows from the authority cited is found in Deuteronomy: Do not say in your heart, “It is because of my righteousness that the LORD has brought me in to possess this land” (Deuteronomy 9:4).

12. But it can be understood in another sense: all things proceed from God’s mercy, so then it is not of him who wills to will, nor of him who runs to exert himself, but of God who shows mercy. As it says in 1 Corinthians: It was not I, but the grace of God that is with me (1 Corinthians 15:10), and in John: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5).

13. But if this is all that is understood by this statement—since even grace without a person’s free judgment does not will or strive—he could have said the converse: that salvation does not depend on God’s mercy but on a person’s will or exertion, which is offensive to pious ears.

    Consequently, something more must be understood from these words if first place is to be given to God’s grace.

    An action is attributed more to the principal agent than to the secondary one, just as we say that the hammer does not make the box, but the carpenter does by using the hammer. But a person’s will is moved to good by God, as it says above: All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God (Romans 8:14). Therefore, a person’s inward action is not to be attributed principally to the person but to God: It is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure (Philippians 2:13).

14. But if willing does not depend on the person willing, or exertion on the person exerting himself, but on God moving the person to this, it seems that the person is not master of his own action, which pertains to freedom of the will.

    The answer is that God moves all things, but in diverse ways, since each is moved in a manner befitting its nature. And so a person is moved by God to will and to perform outwardly in a manner consistent with free will. Therefore, willing and performing depend on the person as a freely acting agent, but on God—and not on the person—as the initial mover.

15. Then he solves the problem as it refers to the rejection of the wicked, when he says, For the Scripture says.

    First, he quotes an authority.

    Second, he draws the conclusion, at Therefore he has mercy on whom he wills.

16. He says, therefore: it has been shown that there is no injustice when God loves the just from all eternity. But neither is there injustice in rejecting the wicked from all eternity. For out of God’s mouth the Scripture says to Pharaoh: For this very purpose I have raised you up, or according to another rendition: I have preserved you for the very purpose of showing my power in you, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth. But our text has: For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth.

17. The first point to notice here is what God does in regard to the rejected. He shows this when he says: For this very purpose I have raised you up. This means: you had deserved to die for the evils you had done—those who do such things deserve to die (Romans 1:32)—but I did not call you to die at once. Rather, I preserved you in life for this purpose, namely, of showing my power in you.

    This interpretation can also be obtained from the version which reads: have I raised you up, meaning, although before me you deserved to be dead, I granted you life, as if I had raised you up. From this it appears that God works no injustice against the rejected, since they deserved to be destroyed at once for their crimes. Rather, the fact that he preserves their life proceeds from his exceeding goodness: Correct me, O LORD, but in justice; not in your anger, lest you bring me to nothing (Jeremiah 10:24).

    Another interpretation is this: have I raised you up for sin, that you might become worse. This should not be understood as if God causes sin in a person. Rather, it should be understood in a permissive sense, namely, that from his just judgment he permits some to fall into sin on account of previous sins, as it says above: God gave them up to a debased mind (Romans 1:28).

    But it seems to me that still more must be understood here: namely, that people are moved to good and to evil by God through an inward prompting. Hence, Augustine says in his book On Grace and Free Will that God works in people’s hearts to incline their wills wherever he wills, either to good through his mercy or to evil according to their deserts. Thus, God is very often said to stir up people to do good, as it says in Daniel: The Lord raised up the Holy Spirit of a young boy (Daniel 13:45). He is also said to raise up others to do evil, as in Isaiah: I will stir up the Medes against them... with their arrows they shall kill the children (Isaiah 13:17).

    However, he stirs them to good and to evil in different ways. He inclines people’s wills to good directly as the author of these good deeds. But he is said to incline or stir up people to evil as an occasional cause—that is, since God puts before a person, either in him or outside of him, something which of itself is conducive to good but which through his own malice he uses for evil: Do you not know that God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance? But by your hard and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath (Romans 2:4–5) and God gave him a place for repentance, but he abused it for pride (Job 24:23).

    Similarly, as far as it is in him, God enlightens a person inwardly to good—for example, a king to defend the rights of his kingdom or to punish rebels. But the king abuses this good impulse according to the malice of his heart. This is plain in Isaiah, where it is said of Assyria: Against a godless nation I send him, and against the people of my wrath I command him to take spoil and seize plunder (Isaiah 10:6). And further on: But he does not so intend, and his heart does not so think, but it is in his heart to destroy. That is what happened with Pharaoh, who, when he was prompted by God to defend his kingdom, abused this suggestion and practiced cruelty.

18. Second, we need to consider the purpose behind God’s doing certain things and permitting certain things.

    One must remember that God works in creatures to manifest himself, as it says in Romans: His invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made (Romans 1:20). Hence, these promptings are ordained to this manifestation both for those present—for the very purpose of showing my power in you; and Israel saw the great work that the LORD did against the Egyptians (Exodus 14:31)—and for those absent—so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth; Declare his glory among the nations (Psalms 96:3).

    Thus, it is clear that in this matter there is no injustice in God, because he uses his creature according to its merits for his glory. And it can be interpreted in the same sense if it is said, have I raised you up, meaning, I have ordered your malice for my glory. For God orders the malice, but does not cause it.

19. Then when he says, Therefore he has mercy on whom he wills, he draws a conclusion from the two texts cited. From the statement, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, he concludes: therefore he has mercy on whom he wills; The LORD has mercy on those who fear him (Psalms 103:11). From the text, have I raised you up, he concludes, and he hardens whomever he wills; You have hardened our heart, so that we fear you not (Isaiah 63:17); Some of them he blessed and exalted... and some of them he has cursed and brought low .

    There seems to be no difficulty about God’s mercy, once we grant what has been said above.

20. But two difficulties seem to exist regarding hardening.

    First, hardening of the heart seems related to sin, as it says in Sirach: A hard heart will have evil at the last . Consequently, if God hardens the heart, he is the author of sin—contrary to what is said in James: God is not a tempter to evil (James 1:13).

    The answer is that God is not said to harden anyone directly, as if he causes their malice, but indirectly. This happens when a person makes an occasion of sin out of things God does within or outside him, and this God himself permits. Hence, God is not said to harden by inserting malice, but by not providing grace.

21. The second difficulty is that this hardening does not seem ascribable to the divine will, since it is written: This is the will of God, your sanctification (1 Thessalonians 4:3) and He desires all people to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4).

    The answer is that both mercy and justice imply a disposition of the will. Hence, just as mercy is attributed to the divine will, so also is that which is just.

    Therefore, the interpretation is that he has mercy on whom he wills through his mercy, and he hardens whom he wills through his justice, because those whom he hardens deserve to be hardened by him, as was stated above (in chapter 1).