John Calvin Commentary Romans 13

Let every soul, etc. Since he handles this subject so carefully in connection with what constitutes the Christian life, it appears that he was compelled to do so by some great necessity that existed especially in that age, although the preaching of the gospel always makes this necessary.

There are indeed always some tumultuous spirits who believe that the kingdom of Christ cannot be sufficiently elevated unless all earthly powers are abolished, and that they cannot enjoy the liberty given by Him unless they shake off every yoke of human subjection. This error, however, particularly influenced the minds of the Jews; for it seemed disgraceful to them that the descendants of Abraham, whose kingdom flourished before the Redeemer’s coming, should now, after His appearance, continue in submission to another power.

There was also another thing that alienated both Jews and Gentiles from their rulers, because these rulers not only all hated piety but also persecuted religion with the most hostile feelings. Therefore, it seemed unreasonable to acknowledge them as legitimate princes and rulers, who were attempting to take the kingdom away from Christ, the only Lord of heaven and earth.

For these reasons, it is probable that Paul was prompted to establish the authority of magistrates with greater care than usual. He proceeds as follows:

1. First, he lays down a general precept, which briefly includes what he says later.
2. Second, he adds an explanation and a proof of his precept.

He calls them the higher powers, not the supreme, who possess the chief authority, but such as excel other people. Magistrates are therefore called this in relation to their subjects, and not as compared with each other. And it truly seems to me that the Apostle, by this word, intended to remove the frivolous curiosity of people, who are often accustomed to inquiring by what right those who rule have obtained their authority. But it should be enough for us that they do rule; for they have not risen to this high position by their own power but have been placed there by the Lord’s hand. And by mentioning every soul, he removes every exception, so that no one might claim an exemption from the common duty of obedience.

For there is no power, etc. The reason we should be subject to magistrates is because they are established by God’s ordinance. For since it pleases God to govern the world in this way, whoever attempts to overturn God’s order, and thus to resist God Himself, despises His power; since to despise the providence of Him who is the founder of civil power is to wage war against Him.

Understand further that powers are from God—not in the same way that pestilence, famine, wars, and other visitations for sin are said to be from Him, but because He has appointed them for the legitimate and just government of the world. For although tyrannies and the unjust exercise of power, being full of disorder (ἀταξίας), are not an ordained government, yet the right of government itself is ordained by God for the well-being of humankind.

Just as it is lawful to repel wars and to seek remedies for other evils, so the Apostle commands us willingly and cheerfully to respect and honor the right and authority of magistrates, as beneficial to people. For the punishments God inflicts on people for their sins, we cannot properly call ordinances; rather, they are the means He intentionally appoints for the preservation of legitimate order.

And those who resist, etc. Since no one can resist God except to their own ruin, he threatens, that those who in this respect oppose the providence of God will not go unpunished. Let us then beware, so that we do not incur this denunciation.

And by judgment, I understand not only the punishment that is inflicted by the magistrate, as if he had only said, that those who resisted authority would be justly punished; but also the vengeance of God, however it may eventually be executed. For he teaches us in general what end awaits those who contend with God.

For princes, etc. He now commends to us obedience to princes on the ground of utility; for the causative γὰρ, for, is to be referred to the first proposition, and not to the last verse. Now, the utility is this — that the Lord has designed in this way to provide for the tranquillity of the good, and to restrain the waywardness of the wicked; by which two things the safety of mankind is secured. For unless the fury of the wicked is resisted, and the innocent are protected from their violence, all things would fall into entire confusion. Since then this is the only remedy by which mankind can be preserved from destruction, it ought to be carefully observed by us, unless we wish to avow ourselves as the public enemies of the human race.

And he adds, Will you not then fear the power? Do good. By this he intimates that there is no reason why we should dislike the magistrate, if indeed we are good; indeed, that it is an implied proof of an evil conscience, and of one that is devising some mischief, when anyone wishes to shake off or to remove from himself this yoke. But he speaks here of the true, and, as it were, of the native duty of the magistrate, from which however those who hold power often degenerate; yet the obedience due to princes ought to be rendered to them. For since a wicked prince is the Lord’s scourge to punish the sins of the people, let us remember that it happens through our fault that this excellent blessing of God is turned into a curse.

Let us then continue to honor the good appointment of God, which may be easily done, provided we impute to ourselves whatever evil may accompany it. Hence he teaches us here the end for which magistrates are instituted by the Lord; the happy effects of which would always appear, if so noble and salutary an institution were not marred through our fault. At the same time, princes never abuse their power by harassing the good and innocent to such an extent that they do not retain in their tyranny some kind of just government: there can, therefore, be no tyranny which does not in some respects assist in consolidating human society.

He has here noted two things, which even philosophers have considered as part of a well-ordered administration of a commonwealth: that is, rewards for the good, and punishment for the wicked. The word praise has here, after the Hebrew manner, a wide meaning.

For he is God’s minister for good, etc. From this, magistrates may learn what their calling is, for they are not to rule for their own interest, but for the public good; nor are they endowed with unbridled power, but rather with power restricted to the well-being of their subjects. In short, they are responsible to God and to men in the exercise of their power. For as they are appointed by God and do His work, they must give an account to Him: and the ministry which God has committed to them concerns the subjects; they are therefore also debtors to them. And private citizens are reminded that it is through divine goodness that they are defended by the sword of rulers against harm done by the wicked.

For they bear not the sword in vain, etc. It is another part of the office of magistrates to forcibly repress the rebelliousness of evil men, who are unwilling to be governed by laws, and to inflict such punishment for their offenses as God’s judgment requires; for Scripture expressly declares that they are armed with the sword, not for an empty show, but so that they may strike evil-doers.

And then Scripture says, An avenger, to execute wrath, etc. This is the same as saying that the magistrate is an executioner of God’s wrath; and he shows himself to be this by bearing the sword, which the Lord has delivered into his hand. This is a remarkable passage for proving the right of the sword; for if the Lord, by arming the magistrate, has also committed to him the use of the sword, whenever he punishes the guilty with death, he obeys God’s commands by executing His vengeance. Then do those contend with God who think it unlawful to shed the blood of wicked men.

It is therefore necessary, etc. What he had at first commanded regarding obedience to magistrates, he now briefly repeats, but with an addition: we ought to obey them, not only out of necessity arising from human authority, but because in doing so we obey God.

For by wrath he means the punishment which the magistrates inflict for contempt of their dignity; as if he had said, “We must not only obey because we cannot resist the powerful and those armed with authority with impunity, as injuries that cannot be repelled are usually endured; but we ought to obey willingly, as conscience through God’s word so binds us.”

Even if the magistrate were disarmed, so that we could provoke and despise him with impunity, yet such a thing should no more be attempted than if we saw punishment suspended over us. For it is not for a private individual to remove authority from him whom the Lord has set in power over us.

This entire discussion concerns civil government. Therefore, it is futile for those who would exercise dominion over consciences to attempt, on this basis, to establish their sacrilegious tyranny.