Thomas Aquinas Commentary John 5:18-20

"For this cause therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only brake the sabbath, but also called God his own Father, making himself equal with God. Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing: for what things soever he doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner. For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth: and greater works than these will he show him, that ye may marvel." — John 5:18-20 (ASV)

1. Here we have Christ’s teaching on his life-giving power.

   First, his teaching is presented.

   Second, it is confirmed, at if I bear witness about myself, my witness is not true (John 5:31).

   Two things are done with the first point.

   First, Christ’s teaching on his life-giving power in general is given.

   Second, it is presented in particular, at and greater works than these will he show him.

   Regarding the first, three things are done.

   First, the origin of this power is mentioned.

   Second, the greatness of this power, at for whatever he does, these the Son also does in like manner.

   Third, the reason for each is given, at for the Father loves the Son.

2. We should point out, with respect to the first point, that the Arians use what Christ said here, the Son cannot do anything of himself, to support their error that the Son is less than the Father. As the Evangelist said, the Jews persecuted Christ for making himself equal to God. But the Arians say that when our Lord saw that this disturbed the Jews, he tried to correct this by stating that he was not equal to the Father, saying, amen, amen, I say to you, the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing. As if to say: Do not interpret what I said, my Father works even until now, and so do I, as meaning that I work as though I am equal to the Father, for I cannot do anything of myself. Therefore, they say, because the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing, he is less than the Father.

   But this interpretation is false and erroneous. For if the Son were not equal to the Father, then the Son would not be the same as the Father; and this is contrary to: I and the Father are one (John 10:30). Equality is considered with respect to greatness, which in divine realities is the essence itself. Hence, if the Son were not equal to the Father, he would be different from him in essence.

3. To understand the true meaning of Christ’s statement, we should know that in those matters which seem to imply inferiority in the Son, it could be said, as some do, that they apply to Christ according to the human nature he assumed; as when he said: the Father is greater than I (John 14:28). According to this, they would say that our Lord’s statement, the Son cannot do anything of himself, should be understood of the Son in his assumed nature. However, this does not stand up, because then one would be forced to say that whatever the Son of God did in his assumed nature, the Father had done before him. For example, that the Father had walked on the water as Christ did; otherwise, he would not have said, but only what he sees the Father doing.

   And if we say that whatever Christ did in his flesh, God the Father also did insofar as the Father works in him—the Father who abides in me, he does the works (John 14:10)—then Christ would be saying that the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing in him, that is, in the Son. But this cannot stand either, because Christ’s next statement, for whatever he does, these the Son also does in like manner, could not, in this interpretation, be applied to him, that is, to Christ. For the Son, in his assumed nature, never created the world, as the Father did. Consequently, what we read here must not be understood as pertaining to Christ’s assumed nature.

4. According to Augustine, however, there is another way of understanding statements which seem to, but do not, imply inferiority in the Son: namely, by referring them to the origin of the Son, who comes from or is begotten by the Father. For although the Son is equal to the Father in all things, he receives all these things from the Father in an eternal begetting. But the Father receives these from no one, for he is unbegotten.

   According to this explanation, the continuity of thought is the following: Why are you offended because I said that God is my Father, and because I made myself equal to God? Amen, amen, I say to you, the Son cannot do anything of himself. As if to say: I am equal to the Father, but in such a way that I am from him, and not he from me. Whatever I do is in me from the Father.

5. According to this interpretation, mention is made of the power of the Son when he says, can, and of his activity when he says, do. Both can be understood here, so that, first, the derivation of the Son’s power from the Father is shown, and second, the conformity of the Son’s activity to that of the Father.

6. Regarding the first, Hilary explains it this way: a little earlier our Lord said that he is equal to the Father. Some heretics, basing themselves on certain scriptural texts which assert the unity and equality of the Son to the Father, claim that the Son is unbegotten. For example, the Sabellians say that the Son is identical in person with the Father.

   Therefore, so that you do not understand this teaching in this way, he says, the Son cannot do anything of himself, for the Son’s power is identical with his nature. The Son therefore has his power from the same source as he has his being; but he has his being from the Father: I came forth from the Father, and I have come into the world (John 16:28). He also has his nature from the Father, because he is God from God; therefore, it is from him that the Son has his power.

   So his statement, the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing, is the same as saying: the Son, just as he does not have his being except from the Father, so he cannot do anything except from the Father. For in natural things, a thing receives its power to act from the very thing from which it receives its being; for example, fire receives its power to ascend from the very thing from which it receives its form and being. Furthermore, in saying, the Son cannot do anything of himself, no inequality is implied, because this refers to a relation, while equality and inequality refer to quantity.

7. Someone might misunderstand his statement, but only what he sees the Father doing, and take it to mean that the Son works or acts in the way he sees the Father acting—that is, that the Father acts first, and when the Son sees this, then the Son begins to act. It would be like two carpenters, a master and his apprentice, with the apprentice making a cabinet in the way he saw the master do it. But this is not true for the Word, for it was said: all things were made through him (John 1:3). Therefore, the Father did not make something in such a way that the Son saw him doing it and so learned from it.

   Rather, this is said so that the communication of the Father’s nature to the Son might be designated through terms of generation. The verb sees is fittingly used because knowledge is conveyed to us by another through seeing and hearing. We receive our knowledge from things through seeing, and we receive knowledge through hearing from words. Now the Son is none other than wisdom, as we read: I came forth out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures . Accordingly, the derivation of the Son from the Father is nothing other than the derivation of divine wisdom. And so, because the act of seeing indicates the derivation of knowledge and wisdom from another, it is proper for the generation of the Son from the Father to be indicated by an act of seeing. Thus, for the Son to see the Father doing something is nothing other than to proceed by an intellectual procession from the acting Father.

   Another possible explanation of this is given by Hilary. For him, the word sees eliminates all imperfection from the generation of the Son or Word. In physical generation, what is generated changes gradually over time from imperfect to perfect, since it is not perfect when first generated. But this is not so in eternal generation, since this is the generation of what is perfect from what is perfect. And so he says, but only what he sees the Father doing. For since the act of seeing is the act of a perfect thing, it is plain that the Son was begotten as perfect at once, as seeing at once, and not as coming to perfection over a course of time.

8. Regarding the second point, Chrysostom explains it as showing the conformity of the Father to the Son in operation. The meaning is this: I say that it is lawful for me to work on the Sabbath, because my Father, too, continues to work, and I cannot do anything opposed to him. This is because the Son cannot do anything of himself. For one does something of himself when he does not conform himself to another in his actions. But whoever is from another sins if he is opposed to him: he who speaks of himself seeks his own glory (John 7:18). Therefore, whoever exists from another, but acts of himself, sins. Now the Son is from the Father; thus, if he acts of himself, he sins, and this is impossible. So by saying, the Son cannot do anything of himself, he means nothing more than that the Son cannot sin. As if to say: You are persecuting me unjustly for breaking the Sabbath, because I cannot sin, since I do not act in a way opposed to my Father.

   Augustine makes use of both of these explanations, that of Hilary and the one given by Chrysostom, but in different places.

9. Then when he says, for whatever he does, these the Son also does in like manner, he affirms the greatness of Christ's power. He excludes three things in the power of Christ: limitation, difference, and imperfection.

   First, limitation is excluded. Since there are diverse agents in the world, and the first universal agent has power over all other agents, some might think that since the Son is not of himself, he must have a power limited to certain beings, rather than a universal power over all, as the Father has. The other agents, which are from him, have a limited power in proportion to their rank in the order of causality. And so to exclude this he says, whatever he, namely, the Father, does—that is, to all the things to which the Father’s power extends, the Son’s power also extends: all things were made through him (John 1:3).

   Second, difference is excluded. For sometimes a thing that exists from another is able to do whatever that from which it exists does. And yet the things the former does are not the same as those done by that from which it is. For example, if one fire which exists from another can do whatever that other does (i.e., cause combustion), the act of causing combustion would be specifically the same in each, even though one fire ignites certain things and the other fire ignites different things. And so that you do not think that the Son’s activity is different from the activity of the Father in this way, he says, whatever the Father does, these the Son also does, that is, not different things, but the very same.

   Third, imperfection is excluded. Sometimes one and the same thing comes from two agents: from one as the principal and perfect agent, and from the other as an instrumental and imperfect agent. But it does not come in the same way, because the principal agent acts in a different way from the instrumental agent; for the instrumental agent acts imperfectly, and by the power of the other. And so that no one thinks that this is the way the Son does whatever the Father does, he says that whatever the Father does, the Son does in like manner. This means with the same power by which the Father acts, the Son also acts, because the same power and the same perfection are in the Father and the Son: I was with him, forming all things (Proverbs 8:30).

10. Then when he says, for the Father loves the Son, he gives the reason for both the origin of the Son’s power and for its greatness. This reason is the love of the Father, who loves the Son. Thus he says, for the Father loves the Son.

    To understand how the Father’s love for the Son is the reason for the origin and communication of the Son’s power, we should note that a thing is loved in two ways. Since only the good is lovable, a good can be related to love in two ways: as the cause of love, or as caused by love. In us, the good causes love, for the cause of our loving something is its own goodness. Therefore, it is not good because we love it, but rather we love it because it is good. Accordingly, in us, love is caused by what is good. But it is different with God, because God’s love itself is the cause of the goodness in the things that are loved. For it is because God loves us that we are good, since to love is nothing else than to will a good to someone. Thus, since God’s will is the cause of things—for whatever he willed he made (Psalms 113:3)—it is clear that God’s love is the cause of the goodness in things. Hence Dionysius says in The Divine Names (ch. 4) that the divine love did not allow itself to be without issue. So, if we wish to consider the origin of the Son, let us see whether the love with which the Father loves the Son is the principle of his origin, so that he proceeds from it.

    In divine realities, love is taken in two ways: essentially, insofar as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit love; and notionally or personally, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love. But in neither of these ways of taking love can it be the principle of origin of the Son. For if it is taken essentially, it implies an act of the will; and if that were the sense in which it is the principle of origin of the Son, it would follow that the Father generated the Son, not by nature, but by will—and this is false. Again, love is not understood notionally, as pertaining to the Holy Spirit. For it would then follow that the Holy Spirit would be the principle of the Son—which is also false. Indeed, no heretic ever went so far as to say this. For although love, notionally taken, is the principle of all the gifts given to us by God, it is nevertheless not the principle of the Son; rather it proceeds from the Father and the Son.

    Consequently, we must say that this explanation is not taken from love as from a principle but as from a sign. For since likeness is a cause of love (for every animal loves its like), wherever a perfect likeness of God is found, there also is found a perfect love of God. But the perfect likeness of the Father is in the Son, as is said: he is the Image of the invisible God (Colossians 1:15); and he is the brightness of the Father’s glory, and the image of his substance (Hebrews 1:3). Therefore, the Son is loved perfectly by the Father, and because the Father perfectly loves the Son, this is a sign that the Father has shown him everything and has communicated to him his very own power and nature. And it is of this love that we read: the Father loves the Son, and he has given all things into his hand (John 3:35); and, this is my beloved Son (Matthew 3:17).

11. With respect to what follows, and shows him all things that he himself does, we should note that someone can show another his works in two ways: either by sight, as an artisan shows his apprentice the things he has made, or by hearing, as when he verbally instructs him.

    Whichever way shows is understood, an inappropriate conclusion can follow, that is, something that is not present when the Father shows things to the Son. For if we say the Father shows things to the Son by sight, then it follows, as with humans, that the Father first does something which he then shows to the Son, and that he does this by himself, without the Son. But the Father does not show the Son things which he did before, for the Son himself says: the Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways, before he made anything (Proverbs 8:22). Nor does the Father show the Son things he has done without the Son, for the Father does all things through the Son: all things were made through him (John 1:3).

    If shows is understood as a kind of hearing, two things seem to follow. For the one who teaches by word first points out something to the one who is ignorant; again, the word is something intermediate between the one showing and the one being shown. But it is in neither of these ways that the Father shows things to the Son: for he does not do so to one who is ignorant, since the Son is the Wisdom of the Father—Christ is the power of God, and the wisdom of God (1 Corinthians 1:24)—nor does the Father use some intermediate word, because the Son himself is the Word of the Father: the Word was with God (John 1:1).

    Therefore, it is said that the Father shows all that he does to the Son, inasmuch as he gives the Son a knowledge of all of his works. For it is in this way that a master is said to show something to his disciple, inasmuch as he gives him a knowledge of the things he makes. Hence, according to Augustine, for the Father to show anything to the Son is nothing more than for the Father to beget or generate the Son. And for the Son to see what the Father does is nothing more than for the Son to receive his being and nature from the Father.

    Nevertheless, this showing can be considered similar to seeing insofar as the Son is the brightness of the paternal vision, as we read: for the Father, by seeing and understanding himself, conceives the Son, who is the concept of this vision . Again, it can be considered similar to hearing insofar as the Son proceeds from the Father as the Word. As if to say: the Father shows him everything, insofar as he generates him as the brightness and concept of his own wisdom, and as the Word. Thus the words, the Father shows, refer to what was said before: the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing. And the words, all things, refer to, for whatever he does, the Son also does in like manner.