Thomas Aquinas Commentary Romans 7:14-20

"For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do I know not: for not what I would, that do I practise; but what I hate, that I do. But if what I would not, that I do, I consent unto the law that it is good. So now it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me, but to do that which is good [is] not. For the good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I practise. But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me." — Romans 7:14-20 (ASV)

1. After showing that the law is neither evil nor the cause of an evil effect, the Apostle now proves that the law is good.

   In this regard, he does two things:

   First, he proves its goodness from the very opposition to good found in man—an opposition the law cannot take away.

   Second, he shows what can take away this opposition, beginning with the word unhappy (Romans 7:24).

   Regarding the first point, he does three things:

   First, he states his proposition.

   Second, he proves it, beginning with for that which I work.

   Third, he draws a conclusion, beginning with I find then a law (Romans 7:21).

   Regarding the first of these, he does two things:

   First, he asserts the goodness of the law.

   Second, he describes man’s condition, beginning with but I am carnal.

2. First, therefore, he says: we have stated that the law is holy. We said this because we, who are wise in divine matters, know that the law—that is, the old law—is spiritual. This means it is in harmony with man’s spirit: the law of the Lord is stainless (Psalms 19:7). Alternatively, it is spiritual because it was given by the Holy Spirit, who is called the finger of God in the Scriptures: if by the finger of God I cast out demons (Luke 11:20). Hence it is said: he gave Moses two tablets of stone, written with the finger of God (Exodus 31:18).

   Yet the new law is not only called spiritual but is called the law of the Spirit (Romans 8:2), because it is not only given by the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit also imprints it on the heart in which He dwells.

3. Then he indicates man’s condition when he says, but I am carnal.

   This passage can be interpreted in two ways. One way is to see the Apostle speaking in the person of a man existing in sin. This is how Augustine explained it in his book, On 83 Diverse Questions. But later, in a book against Julian, he explained it as though the Apostle were speaking in his own person, that is, as a man in the state of grace.

   Let us, therefore, continue by showing how these words and those that follow can be explained under both interpretations, although the second explanation is better.

4. The first statement, but I am carnal, is interpreted so that the word I stands for human reason, which is the chief part of a person. For this reason, each person seems to be his own reason or intellect, just as a city seems to be its ruler, so that whatever the ruler does, the city is said to do.

5. A person is called carnal because his reason is carnal. Reason is called carnal in two ways. First, because it is submissive to the flesh and consents to the things the flesh urges: for while there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh? (1 Corinthians 3:3). In this sense, it is understood of a person not yet healed by grace. Second, reason is said to be carnal because it is under attack from the flesh: the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit (Galatians 5:17). In this sense, even the reason of a person in the state of grace is said to be carnal. In both cases, it is carnal on account of sin; hence he adds, sold under sin.

6. It should be noted that the carnality that implies a rebellion of the flesh against the spirit arises from the sin of the first parent, because this pertains to the inclination to sin derived from that original sin. However, the carnality that implies the submission of reason to the flesh arises not only from original sin but also from actual sin, through which a person, by obeying the desires of the flesh, makes himself a slave of the flesh. Hence he adds: sold under sin, namely, the sin of the first parent or of oneself.

   He says sold because the sinner sells himself into the slavery of sin as payment for fulfilling his own will: for your iniquities you were sold (Isaiah 50:1).

7. Then, when he says, for that which I work, he clarifies what he had stated:

   First, that the law is spiritual.

   Second, that man is carnal, sold under sin, beginning with now then it is no more I.

   Regarding the first point, he does two things:

   First, he presents a proof.

   Second, he draws a conclusion, beginning with if then I do that which I will not.

   The proof is based on man’s infirmity, which he first asserts and then proves, beginning with for the good which I will.

8. The proof is based on human weakness, which is revealed by the fact that a person does what he knows should not be done. Hence it is said: for that which I work, I do not understand, that is, I do not approve that it should be done.

   This can be understood in two ways. First, it can refer to a person subject to sin, who understands in general that sin should not be committed but, overcome by the devil's suggestion, by passion, or by the inclination of a perverse habit, commits it anyway. Therefore, he is said to do what he knows should not be done, acting against his conscience, just like the servant who knew his master’s will but did not act according to his will (Luke 12:47).

   Second, it can be understood of one in the state of grace. He does evil not by performing the deed or consenting with his mind, but only by desiring it through a passion in the sensitive appetite. That desire escapes the reason or intellect because it arises before the intellect’s judgment. Once the judgment is made, the desire is impeded. Therefore, it is significant that he does not say, "I understand it is not to be done," but I do not understand. This is because such a desire arises before the intellect has deliberated or perceived it: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh (Galatians 5:17).

9. Next, when he says, for I do not that good, he proves what he had said by division and by effect.

   First, he makes a division between not doing good and doing evil, because even a person who does not do good is said to commit sin—that is, a sin of omission—when he says, for that which I work.

   On the other hand, where he says, I do not understand, he proves it through the effect; for since the intellect moves the will, willing is its effect, which is to understand.

10. Regarding the omission of good, therefore, he says, for I do not that good which I will.

    This can be understood in one way of a man in the state of sin. In that case, I do should be understood as a complete action performed outwardly with the consent of reason, whereas I will refers not to a complete act of will commanding the deed, but to an incomplete willing by which people want good in general. They have a correct judgment about good in general, yet this judgment is perverted by a bad habit or a perverse passion, with the result that the will goes wrong when it comes to a particular case and does not do what it knows in a general way should be done and would want to do.

    In another way, it is understood of a man healed by grace. In that case, conversely, I will refers to a complete act of willing that lasts through the act of choosing a particular deed, whereas I do refers to an incomplete action that has gone no further than the sense appetite and has not reached the stage of consent. For a man in the state of grace wants to preserve his mind from wicked desires, but he fails to accomplish this good on account of the disorderly movements of desire that arise in the sensitive appetite. This is similar to what he says in Galatians: so that you do not do all that you will (Galatians 5:17).

11. Second, regarding the perpetration of evil, he says: but the evil which I hate, that I do. If this is understood of the sinner, I hate means an imperfect hatred by which every person naturally hates evil, while I do means an action completely performed in keeping with reason’s consent. For that general hatred of evil is frustrated in a particular choice by the inclination of a habit or passion.

    But if it is understood of a person in the state of grace, I do means an incomplete action that has gone no further than existing as a desire in the sensitive appetite. I hate refers to a complete hatred, by which one continues hating evil until its final rejection: I hate them with a perfect hatred (Psalms 139:22), namely, evil men, inasmuch as they are sinners. As it is written: while the laws were very well observed because of the piety of the high priest Onias and his hatred of wickedness .

12. Then when he says, now if I do, he concludes from the previously mentioned condition of man that the law is good, saying, now if I do that which I will not. Whichever of the aforementioned interpretations is taken, by the very fact that I hate evil, I consent to the law, that it is good, because it forbids the evil that I naturally do not want.

    For it is clear that man’s inclination, in keeping with reason, to will good and flee from evil is in accord with nature or grace, and each is good. Hence, the law also, which agrees with this inclination by commanding what is good and forbidding what is evil, is good for the same reason: I give you good precepts; do not forsake my teaching (Proverbs 4:2).

13. Then, when he says, now then it is no more I, he proves what he had said about man’s condition, namely, that he is carnal and sold under sin.

    In this regard, he does three things:

    First, he states his proposition.

    Second, he proves it, beginning with for I know.

    Third, he draws a conclusion, beginning with if then I do that which I will not.

14. That man is carnal and sold under sin, as being, in a way, a slave of sin, is clear from the fact that he does not act but is led by sin. For a free man acts of himself and is not led by another.

    Therefore, he says: I have said that I consent to the law as far as my intellect and will are concerned, but when I act against the law, it is no more I that do it—that is, do what is against the law—but sin that dwells in me. So it is evident that I am a slave of sin, inasmuch as sin, by exercising its dominion over me, does it.

15. This is easy to understand of a man in the state of grace. The fact that he desires something evil, as far as the sensitive appetite pertaining to the flesh is concerned, does not proceed from the work of reason but from the inclination to sin. A person is said to do what his reason does, because man is what he is according to his reason. Hence, the movements of concupiscible desire, which are not from reason but from the inclination to sin, are not done by the man but by the inclination to sin, which is here called "sin": Whence wars and fightings among you? Is it not your passions that are at war in your members? (James 4:1).

    But this cannot properly be understood of a man in sin, because his reason consents to sin; therefore, he himself commits it. Hence Augustine and a Gloss say: "Greatly deceived is the man who consents to the desires of the flesh and decides to do what they desire and then thinks he can say of himself: I am not doing this."

16. However, there is a way, although forced, to understand this even of a sinner.

    An action is mainly attributed to the principal agent acting by virtue of its own proper characteristic, not to an agent acting by virtue of a characteristic proper to something else by which it is moved. But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in light of what is proper to it, is not inclined to evil, but only insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire. Therefore, the doing of evil, which reason does inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed principally to reason (which is understood here to be the man), but rather to the desire or habit by which reason is inclined to evil.

    It should be noted that sin is said to dwell in man, not as though sin were some reality—since it is a privation of good—but to indicate the permanence of this kind of defect in man.

17. Then, when he says, for I know, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil which man commits.

    First, he presents the middle term proving the proposition.

    Second, he explains the middle term, beginning with for to will.

18. First, therefore, he proves that sin dwelling in man does the evil that man commits. This proof is clear when the words are referred to a man in the state of grace, who has been freed from sin by the grace of Christ (Romans 6:22). Therefore, as for a person in whom Christ’s grace does not dwell, he has not yet been freed from sin. But the grace of Christ does not dwell in the flesh, but in the mind. Hence it is stated below that if Christ is in us, the body is indeed dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justice (Romans 8:10). Therefore, sin, which the desire of the flesh produces, still rules in the flesh.

    For he takes flesh here to include the sensitive powers. The flesh is thus distinguished from the spirit and fights against it, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite tends toward the contrary of what reason seeks, as it says in Galatians: the desires of the flesh are against the spirit (Galatians 5:17).

19. He says, therefore: we have said that in me, even though healed by grace, sin works; but this must be understood of me according to the flesh along with the sensitive appetite. For I know through reason and experience that the good—namely, the good of grace by which I have been reformed—does not dwell in me.

    But lest this be understood to include reason in the manner explained above, he adds: that is to say, in my flesh. For in me, that is, in my heart, this good does dwell, for it says in Ephesians: that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith (Ephesians 3:17).

20. This makes it clear that this passage does not favor the Manicheans, who claim the flesh is not good according to its nature and, consequently, not a good creature of God. On the contrary, it is written: everything created by God is good (1 Timothy 4:4). For the Apostle is not discussing a good of nature but the good of grace, by which we are freed from sin.

21. If this passage referred to a man existing under sin, it would be superfluous to add, that is to say, in my flesh, because in a sinner the good of grace dwells neither in the flesh nor in the mind. A forced interpretation would explain this passage by saying that sin, which is the privation of grace, is somehow derived from the flesh to the mind.

22. Then he clarifies what he had said, when he says for to will:

    First, from man’s capabilities.

    Second, from his action which proves his capability, beginning with for the good which I will.

23. Man’s capability is described first in regard to willing, which seems to be in man’s power. Hence he says, for to will is present with me, that is, it is near to me, as if it were within my power. For as Augustine says, nothing is so much within man’s power as his will.

    Second, he describes man’s capability, or rather his difficulty in achieving an effect, when he says, but to accomplish good, I cannot find, that is, I do not find it within my power. As it says in Proverbs: it is the part of man to prepare the soul (Proverbs 16:1); and, the heart of a man disposes his way, but the Lord directs his steps (Proverbs 16:9).

24. This passage of Paul seems to favor the Pelagians, who said that the start of a good work is from us, inasmuch as we will the good. And this is what the Apostle seems to say: but to accomplish good, I cannot find.

    However, he rejects this interpretation in Philippians: for God is at work in you both to will and to do (Philippians 2:13).

25. Therefore, the fact that to will is present with me, once I have been healed by grace, is due to the work of divine grace. Through this grace, I not only will the good but also do some good, because I resist concupiscence and, led by the spirit, act against it. But I do not find it within my power to accomplish that good so as to exclude concupiscence entirely. This indicates that the good of grace does not reside in the flesh, because if it did, then just as I have the faculty of willing the good because of grace dwelling in the mind, so I would have the faculty of accomplishing the good by virtue of grace residing in the flesh.

    But if this refers to a man existing under sin, then it could be explained so that to will is taken for an incomplete act of willing, which, from the impulse of nature, is good in some who sin. But to will is present to man—that is, it lies next to him—as if it is weak, unless grace bestows on the will the ability for perfection.

26. Then when he says, for the good which I will, I do not, he clarifies what he had said by citing man’s action, which is a sign and effect of human capability. For man does not have the strength to accomplish good, because he does not do the good he wants but does the evil he does not want. This has been explained earlier.

27. Then, when he says, now if I do that which I will not, he returns to what he had previously proposed, saying, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. This, too, has been explained earlier.

    But it should be noted that by using the same middle term, that is, which I will not, the Apostle draws two conclusions he had proposed above: first, the goodness of the law, when he said, now if I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good; and second, the dominion of sin in man, when he says here, now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. The first of these conclusions pertains to his statement that the law is spiritual; the second pertains to the statement, but I am carnal, sold under sin. He draws the first conclusion, about the goodness of the law, from that middle term based on the phrase I do not will, because his mind does not want what the law forbids, which shows that the law is good. But based on the phrase that I do, he concludes that sin, which functions against reason’s will, holds sway over man.